Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts v. ASC Utah, Inc and Enoch Richard Smith:Brief of Appellants by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts v. ASC
Utah, Inc and Enoch Richard Smith:Brief of
Appellants
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph E. Wrona; Todd D. Wakefield; Wrona Law Firm; Attorneys for Appellee and Cross-Appellant
Wolf Mountain Resorts. John R. Rudd; Kara L. Pettit; Snow, Christensen, and Martineau; Attorneys
for Defendant/Appellees. David Eckersley; Prince, Yeates, and Geldzahler; Attorneys for Intervenor.
David W. Scofield; Peters and Scofield; Attorneys for Plantiffs/Appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts v. ASC Utah, No. 20100928 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2613
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STEPHEN A. OSGUTHORPE; AND D.A. 
OSGUTHORPE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 




ASC UTAH. INC. DBA THE CANYONS: 
AMERICAN SKIING COMPANY; LESLIE B. 
OTTEN; AND JOHN DOES 1-XX, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
and 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, 
Intervenor. 
Consolidated Appellate Case No. 
20100928-SC 
(Consolidated with Appellate Case 
Nos. 20110404-SC and 20100987-SC) 
Third District Court Case No. 
060500297 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS (CORRECTED) 
APPEALS FROM JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER'S RULING AND ORDER, ENTERED ON 
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 22,2010 AND ENTERED ON APRIL 12,2011 
Joseph E. Wrona 
Todd D. Wakefield 
WRONA LAW FIRM, P.C. 
1745 Sidewinder Drive 
Pak City, Utah 84098 
Attorneys for Defendant, Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant Wolf Mountain 
Resorts, L.C. 
John R. Rudd 
Kara L Pettit 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
David W. Scofield 
PETERS | SCOFIELD 
A Professional Corporation 
Suite 115 Parleys Corporate Center 
2455 East Parley Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: (801) 322-2002 
Facsimile: (801) 322-2002 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellants 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JANU2012 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES 
John R. Rudd 
Kara L. Pettit 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellees 
Joseph E. Wrona 
Todd D. Wakefield 
WRONA LAW FIRM, P.C. 
1745 Sidewinder Drive, , 
Pak City, Utah 84098 
Attorneys for Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant Wolf Mountain Resorts, 
David Eckersley 
PRINCE, YEATES AND GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Ste. 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84211 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
David W. Scofield 
PETERS | SCOFIELD 
A Professional Corporation 
Suite 115 Parleys Corporate Center 
2455 East Parley Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: (801) 322-2002 
Facsimile: (801) 322-2002 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STEPHEN A OSGUTHORPE;AND ILA. 
OSGUTHORPE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 




ASC UTAH. INC. DBA THE CANYONS: 
AMERICAN SKIING COMPANY; LESLIE B. 
OTTEN; AND JOHN DOES 1 -XX, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
and 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, 
Intervenor. 
Consolidated Appellate Case No. 
20100928-SC 
(Consolidated with Appellate Case 
Nos. 20110404-SC and 20100987-SC) 
Third District Court Case No. 
060500297 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS (CORRECTED) 
APPEALS FROM JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER'S RULING AND ORDER, ENTERED ON 
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 22,2010 AND ENTERED ON APRIL 12,2011 
Joseph E. Wrona 
Todd D. Wakefield 
WRONA LAW FIRM, P.C. 
1745 Sidewinder Drive 
Pak City, Utah 84098 
Attorneys for Defendant, Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant Wolf Mountain 
Resorts, L.C. 
John R. Rudd 
Kara L. Pettit 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
David W. Scofield 
PETERS | SCOFIELD 
A Professional Corporation 
Suite 115 Parleys Corporate Center 
2455 East Parley Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: (801) 322-2002 
Facsimile: (801) 322-2002 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES 
John R. Rudd 
Kara L. Pettit 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellees 
David W. Scofield 
PETERS | SCOFIELD 
A Professional Corporation 
Suite 115 Parleys Corporate Center 
2455 East Parley Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: (801) 322-2002 
Facsimile: (801) 322-2002 
for Plaintiff/Appellants 
Joseph E. Wrona 
Todd D. Wakefield 
WRONA LAW FIRM, P.C. 
1745 Sidewinder Drive, 
Pak City, Utah 84098 
Attorneys for Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. 
David Eckersley 
PRINCE, YEATES AND GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Ste. 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84211 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATUTES AND RULES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL • • • • • • • • • ' 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 2 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN NOT COMPELLING ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE TERMS OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND THE UTAH ARBITRATION ACT? 2 
i. Standard of appellate review 2 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN NOT STAYING THE LITIGATION PENDING 
ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND THE UTAH 
ARBITRATION ACT? .3 
ii. Standard of appellate review 3 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN NOT AFFORDING PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT DUE 
PROCESS BY RULING WITHOUT NOTICE OR ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING 
REGARDING THE EFFECT OF ASC UTAH, INC. V. WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, LC, 
2010 UT 65,245 P.3D 184 (2010) ON UTAH LAW? 3 
iii. Standard of appellate review 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
A. Nature of the Case 4 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 7 
C. Brief Statement of the Facts of the Case 11 
D. Summary of the Argument 16 
ARGUMENT 17 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I. THE PUBLIC POLICY DETERMINATION OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE AND THE 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO ENFORCE VALID ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS IS PARAMOUNT AND MAY NOT BE SUBORDINATED TO ANY OTHER 
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 17 
II. IF UTAH LAW DID IN FACT SUBORDINATE THE PUBLIC POLICY OF ENFORCING 
VALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS TO THE PUBLIC POLICY OF SPEEDY AND 
INEXPENSIVE RESOLUTIONS, THEN IT IS PRE-EMPTED BY THE FAA 21 
III. BOTH THE UAA AND FAA REQUIRE ARBITRATION OF ALL SPA AGREEMENT 
ISSUES CONCERNING DISPUTES BETWEEN ASC AND WOLF MOUNTAIN- THEY 
AFFECT OSGUTHORPE'S SPA AGREEMENT DISPUTE 22 
IV. OSGUTHORPE WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS 31 
V. THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT MUST BE VACATED, THE SPA AGREEMENT 
ISSUES COMPELLED TO ARBITRATION AND THE ACTION STAYED PENDING 
ARBITRATION , 32 
CONCLUSION 34 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(F)(1) 35 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 36 
APPENDICES: 
1. Ruling and Order (Arbitration Issues), issued Saturday, November 20, 
2010, entered on Monday, November 22, 2010, 
2. Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act for 
Order Compelling Arbitration and for Immediate Stay and Dismissing 
Claimed Arbitrable Issues Without Prejudice, entered on April 12, 2011 
3. Ruling and Order, entered April 29, 2009. 
4. Pages of the Amended and Restated Development Agreement For the 
Canyons Specially Planned Area- Snyderville Basin, Summit County, Utah 
("SPA Agreement") 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 
2010UT65,245P.3D184(2010) 3,5,6,7,10,19 
AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Infinity Financial Group, LLC, 
608 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (S.D. Fla. 1999) 25 
Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 
2007 UT 17, 156 P.3d 782 32 
Bybee v. Abdulla, 
2008 UT 35,189 P.3d 40 2, 3, 23 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 
No. 10-948, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 575 U.S. (January 10, 2012) . . . 18 
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 
470 U.S. 213, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 84 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1985) 19, 20, 21 
Ellsworth v. American Arbitration Association, 
2006 UT 77,148 P.3d 983 23 
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 
514 U.S. 938, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 131 L Ed. 2d 985 (1995) 28 
Hicks v. Cadle Co., 
Nos. 08-1306, 1307, 1429 & 1435, 355 Fed. Appx. 186, 192, 2009 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 26523 (10th Cir. December 7, 2009) (unpublished decision) 28 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water Co., 
942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996) 15 
Hill v. Ricoh Americas Corp., 
603 F.3d 766 (10th Cir. 2010) 30 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 
537 U.S. 79, 123 S. Ct. 588, 154 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2002) 29, 30 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
J.Sv.P.K. (In re Adoption of IK.), 
2009 UT 70, 220 P.3d 464 3 
Klay v. All Defendants, 
389 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2004) 25 
Latter v. Holsum Bread Co., 
108 Utah 364, 160 P.2d 421 (1945) 18 
Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 
636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981) 23 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 
514 U.S. 52, 115 S. Ct. 1212, 131 L Ed. 2d 76 (1995) 27 
McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 
413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005) 15 
McCoy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah, 
2001 UT 31, 20 P.3d 901 23, 24 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 105 S. Ct. 3346, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1985) 27 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 
460 U.S. 1 (1983) 27 
National American Insurance Co. v. SCOR Reinsurance Co., 
362 F.3d 1288 (10th Cir. 2004) 29 
Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 
2009 UT 54, 217P.3d716 23 
Pledgery. Gillespie, 
1999 UT 54, 982 P.2d 572 33 
Reed v. Davis County Sch. Dist, 
892 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995) .23 
IV 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n v. Atherton, 
2011 UT 58 31, 32 
Shell Oil Co. v. Col Comm., Inc., 
589 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2009) .30 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1, 104 S. Ct. 852, 79 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984) , 22, 25, 26 
Vaden v. Discover Bank, 
129 S. Ct. 1262, 173 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2009) ,26 
FEDERAL STATUTES. RULES AND AUTHORITY: 
UNITED STATES CONST, AMEND. XIV, C L 1 i, 31 
9 U.S.C. § 2 i, 22 
9 U.S.C. § 3 i 
9 U.S.C. § 4 ii 
9 U.S.C. § 16 2 
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 18 
STATE STATUTES. RULES AND OTHER AUTHORITY: 
UTAH CONST, ART. I, § 7 i 
Utah Arbitration Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31 a-1 to -20 (1999) 18 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-4 (1999) ii 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-4(3) (1999) 25 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-19(1) (1999) 1,2 
' • ' ' • . v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)0) .1,2 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-11-129(1 )(a) 1,2 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1i-108(7) 25 
UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a) 1,2 
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 (RUAA) § 6(c) cmt. 2) 31 
SPA Agreement Arbitration Provision
 f iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES AND RULES O F IMPORTANCE T O T H E APPEAL 
UNITED STATES CONST, AMEND. XIV, CL. 1: [Citizenship Rights.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONST, ART. I, § 7. [Due Process of Law] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
9 U.S.C. § 2. VALIDITY, IRREVOCABILITY, AND ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS 
TOARBITRATE 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to 
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit 
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, 
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract. 
9 U.S.C. § 3. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS WHERE ISSUE THEREIN REFERABLE 
TO ARBITRATION 
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United 
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in 
writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon 
being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is 
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of 
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been 
had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant 
for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration. 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 U.S.C. § 4. FAILURE TO ARBITRATE UNDER AGREEMENT; PETITION TO UNITED 
STATES COURT HAVING JURISDICTION FOR ORDER TO COMPEL ARBITRATION; 
NOTICE AND SERVICE THEREOF; HEARING AND DETERMINATION 
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to 
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United 
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have 
jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject 
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an 
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in 
such agreement. Five days' notice in writing of such application shall be 
served upon the party in default. Service thereof shall be made in the 
manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall 
hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement 
for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court 
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and proceedings, 
under such agreement, shall be within the district in which the petition for 
an order directing such arbitration is filed. If the making of the arbitration 
agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in 
issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial 
be demanded by the party alleged to be in default, or if the matter in 
dispute is within admiralty jurisdiction, the court shall hear and determine 
such issue. Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in 
default may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the return day of the 
notice of application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and upon such 
demand the court shall make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury 
in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may 
specially call a jury for that purpose. If the jury find that no agreement in 
writing for arbitration was made or that there is no default in proceeding 
thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed. If the jury find that an 
agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default in 
proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily directing 
the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms 
thereof. 
UTAH C O D E ANN. § 78-31a-4 (1999) COURT ORDER TO ARBITRATE 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an 
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is 
raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of 
ii 
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the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those 
issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly. 
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement 
is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having 
jurisdiction to hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall be made 
to that court. Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court with proper 
venue. 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action or 
proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. 
However, if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or 
proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is 
made in an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a 
stay of the action or proceeding. 
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a claim 
that an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for 
the claim have not been shown. 
SPA AGREEMENT ARBITRATION PROVISION 
Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism contained 
herein shall not sufficiently resolve a dispute under this Amended 
Agreement, then every such continuing dispute, difference, and 
disagreement shall be referred to a single arbitrator agreed upon by the 
parties, or if no single arbitrator can be agreed upon, an arbitrator or 
arbitrators shall be selected in accordance with the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association and such dispute, difference, or disagreement shall 
be resolved by the binding decision of the arbitrator 
SPA Agreement, at § 5.8.1 
iii 
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JURISDICTION 
The district court issued a Ruling and Order (re Arbitration Issues) on 
Saturday, November 20, 2010, which was entered on Monday, November 22, 
2010, [hereinafter "Order Denying Arbitration"]. The current provisions of the Utah 
Uniform Arbitration Act, UTAH C O D E ANN. § 78B-11-129(1 )(a) and of its 
predecessor, the Utah Arbitration Act, UTAH C O D E ANN. § 78-31 a-19(1) (1999), 
each provide an immediate right of appeal from an order denying a motion to 
compel arbitration. The notice of appeal to this Court was filed on Monday, 
November 22, 2010, shortly after the Order Denying Arbitration was entered and 
within 30 days after the date of entry of such order, as required by UTAH R. APP. 
P. 4(a). 
This Court has original appellate jurisdiction over the appeal from the Order 
Denying Arbitration pursuant to UTAH C O D E ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). That appeal 
was assigned Appellate Case No. 20100928-SC. 
Plaintiff and Appellant The D A Osguthorpe Family Partnership 
("Osguthorpe") argued to the trial court that the appeal in Appellate Case No. 
20100928-SC deprived it of jurisdiction to proceed further on any arbitrable 
issues. The trial court disagreed and so Plaintiff and Appellant filed its second 
motion to stay and compel arbitration, this time expressly grounded on the federal 
arbitration act. The trial court denied that motion and an Order denying such 
motion was entered on Tuesday, April 12, 2011.The current provisions of the 
1 
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Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-11-129(1 )(a) and of its 
predecessor, the Utah Arbitration Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31 a-19(1) (1999), 
each provide an immediate right of appeal from an order denying a motion to 
compel arbitration, as does the federal arbitration act, 9 U.S.C. § 16. The notice 
of appeal to this Court from that Order was filed one week later, on Tuesday, April 
19, 2011, within 30 days after the date of entry of such order, as required by 
UTAH R. A P P . P. 4(a). 
This Court has original appellate jurisdiction over the appeal from the 
second Order pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). The appeal from 
that Order was assigned Appellate Case No. 20110404-SC. These two appeals 
by Plaintiff and Appellant were consolidated into the first-filed appeal, Appellate 
Case No. 20100928-SC, by Order of this Court dated July 12, 2011. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN NOT COMPELLING ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE TERMS OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND THE UTAH ARBITRATION ACT? 
i. Standard of appellate review. 
Whether the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership has the right under the 
Arbitration Agreement to have the court enforce the Arbitration Agreement by 
compelling ASC Utah and Wolf Mountain to arbitrate their claims under or relating 
to the SPA Agreement is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. 
Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, fl 7,189 P.3d 40,43. 
2 
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DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN NOT STAYING THE LITIGATION PENDING 
ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND THE UTAH 
ARBITRATION ACT? 
ii. Standard of appellate review. 
Whether the D A Osguthorpe Family Partnership has the right under the 
Federal Arbitration Act and Utah Arbitration Act to have the court stay the 
litigation pending arbitration of all arbitrable issues under or relating to the SPA 
Agreement is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Bybee v. 
Abdulla, 2008 UT 35,U 7, 189 P.3d 40, 43. 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN NOT AFFORDING PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT DUE 
PROCESS BY RULING WITHOUT NOTICE OR ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING 
REGARDING THE EFFECT OF ASC UTAH, INC. V. WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C., 
2010 UT 65,245 P.3D 184 (2010) ON UTAH LAW? 
iii. Standard of appellate review. 
"Constitutional issues, including questions regarding due process, are 
questions of law that we review for correctness." J.S v. P.K. (In re Adoption of 
/ . /g, 2009 UT 70, U 7, 220 P.3d 464, 467. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case concerns the contractual right of one party to a thirty-six (36) 
party mandatory arbitration agreement (The D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership 
[hereinafter "Osguthorpe"] (a) to compel the arbitration of arbitrable issues that 
3 
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are being litigated between two (2) of the other parties to the arbitration 
agreement (Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. [hereinafter "Wolf Mountain"] and ASC 
Utah, Inc. dba The Canyons [hereinafter "ASC"]), which two parties have waived 
their own right to arbitration of the arbitrable issues and (b) to have the litigation in 
which those two other parties are litigating the arbitrable issues stayed pending 
the arbitration of the arbitrable issues that must be decided in arbitration. 
The arbitration agreement at issue is contained within an agreement called 
the "Amended and Restated Development Agreement For ASC Specially 
Planned Area- Snyderville Basin, Summit County, Utah," ("SPA Agreement"), R. 
12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4. As shown by its signature pages, the thirty-six 
(36) parties to the SPA Agreement who have contracted for the resolution of all 
disputes under the SPA Agreement by way of mandatory and binding arbitration 
are: (1) Summit County; (2) ASC; (3) American Skiing Company Resort 
Properties, Inc.; (4) Beaver Creek Associates; (5) Thair Schneiter; (6) Wolf 
Mountain; (7) Willow Draw, L.C; (8) Osguthorpe; (9) Oliver B. Johnston Family 
Partnership; (10) William Lincoln Spoor; (11) Leslee Sherrill Spoor; (12) Iron 
Mountain Associates, LLC; (13) IHC Hospitals, Inc. nka IHC Health Services, Inc.; 
(14) Olympus Construction, LLC; (15) ASC Cabin Club, LLC; (16) Harold E. 
Babcock; (17) Halbet Engineering, Inc.; (18) Harold R. Weight; (19) Ruth B. 
Weight; (20) State of Utah School & Institutional Trust Lands; (21) Mines 
Ventures Company, Inc.; (22) C & M Properties, LLC; (23) Silver King Mines; (24) 
4 
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Parkway Land Development, LC; (25) Parkwest Associates; (26) Sugarbowl 
Associates, LLC; (27) Richard Jaffa; (28) Joseph L. Krofcheck; (29) Gerald 
Friedman; (30) The Hansen Group, LC; (31) Robert M. Astle; (32) Joan E. Astle; 
(33) DRM Investment Company, LC; (34) Jack Barnard; (35) Gregory A. Dean; 
and (36) Ski Land, LLC. R. 12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4. 
ASC argues that it is entitled to complete the litigation it started in 2006 of 
arbitrable issues it raised in a dispute it has with Wolf Mountain. Wolf Mountain, 
for its part, after freely litigating the arbitrable issues in ASC's dispute and its own 
disputes it raised against ASC for years, moved to compel arbitration and its 
motion was denied because, the trial court ruled, Wolf Mountain had waived its 
own right to arbitration by litigating the arbitrable issues for years. This Court 
affirmed that determination in ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC, 
2010 UT 65, 245 P.3d 184 (2010). Following the ruling about its own waiver, Wolf 
Mountain proceeded with ASC, to litigate the arbitrable issues in contravention of 
Osguthorpe's demand to have all the arbitrable SPA Agreement dispute issues 
arbitrated. 
The SPA Agreement involved the exchange and development of certain 
real property in Summit County, Utah, at the base of The Canyons ski resort. 
Osguthorpe had the right to receive and develop valuable commercial real 
property under the SPA Agreement and Summit County granted Osguthorpe 
essential entitlements for such purposes by virtue of the SPA Agreement. 
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ASC and Wolf Mountain had each waived their individual rights to demand 
arbitration and each had instead been litigating issues concerning respective 
claims of delay in the development of the golf course required by the SPA 
Agreement. In September, 2009, Summit County issued a notice of default to 
Osguthorpe, ASC, Wolf Mountain and several other parties for non-performance 
under the SPA Agreement. Summit County threatened that if such defaults were 
not cured, that it would strip Osguthorpe's entitlements. The defaults alleged by 
Summit County against Osguthorpe included the very disputed issued under the 
SPA Agreement that had been litigated for years between Wolf Mountain and 
ASC. So all of the arbitrable issues as to which only ASC and Wolf Mountain had 
waived their arbitration rights and chosen to litigate as between themselves, were 
now issues which affected claims of Osguthorpe arising from the Summit County 
notice of default. Osguthorpe therefore had the contractual right to compel ASC 
and Wolf Mountain to have all such issues decided by binding arbitration, even 
the issues that two of the thirty-six parties to the SPA Agreement had chose to 
litigate. 
When Osguthorpe made a motion to compel arbitration and to stay the 
litigation of all such arbitrable issues, the trial court, relying on the change in the 
prior law of arbitration which the trial court found was a change in the landscape 
in the law of arbitration, effected by ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, 
L.C., 2010 UT 65, 245 P.3d 184 (2010), held that none of the thirty-six parties to 
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the SPA Agreement, which included Osguthorpe, any longer had an enforceable 
contract right of arbitration with respect to the arbitrable issues under the SPA 
Agreement that had been litigated between only two parties to the SPA 
Agreement. 
Osguthorpe here argues that the trial court erred in determining that no 
right to compel arbitration of all of the arbitrable issues litigated as between ASC 
and Wolf Mountain existed any longer, not by virtue of the arbitration agreement, 
itself, but instead by virtue of a change in Utah public policy. The litigation should 
have been stayed and ASC and Wolf Mountain ordered to proceed to arbitration 
with Osguthorpe and other parties to the SPA Agreement who shared an interest 
in the arbitrable issues as the result of Summit County's declared default and 
forfeiture of entitlements. Further, because it relied entirely on this Court's 
Opinion in ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT65, 245 P.3d 
184 (2010), but denied Osguthorpe any opportunity to address that Opinion or its 
affect on Osguthorpe's motion, Osguthorpe was denied due process of law. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
On June 14, 2006, ASC filed this action against Wolf Mountain (and Wolf 
Mountain later counterclaimed) alleging certain breaches of contract by Wolf 
Mountain, including breaches of Wolf Mountain's obligations under the SPA 
Agreement, and Wolf Mountain counterclaimed, also claiming breaches of 
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contract against ASC, including breaches of ASC's obligations under the SPA 
Agreement. 
On August 11, 2006, Osguthorpe filed its separate complaint in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case No. 060913348, against 
Wolf Mountain, alleged certain breaches of an agreement between Osguthorpe 
and Wolf Mountain by which Osguthorpe allowed Wolf Mountain to have the use 
of some of its real property (unrelated to the SPA Agreement). On or about 
January 10, 2007, the trial court sua sponte transferred that case to the Third 
District Court, Summit County, State of Utah, where it was assigned Case No. 
070500018. 
On September 21,2007, Osguthorpe filed its separate complaint in the 
Third District Court, Summit County, State of Utah, Case No. 070500520, against 
ASC, alleged certain breaches of the Wolf Mountain agreement to which ASC 
had succeeded and other agreements between Osguthorpe and ASC by which 
Osguthorpe allowed ASC to have the use of some of its real property (unrelated 
to the SPA Agreement). 
On October 27, 2007 and December 12,2007, ASC filed two separate 
motions to consolidate the Osguthorpe's two separate cases, neither of which 
involved the SPA Agreement, with its case with Wolf Mountain, part of which 
involved the SPA Agreement. R. 1481-1483 and R. 1547-1549. Osguthorpe 
vigorously opposed consolidation but, because of Wolf Mountain's claim that the 
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Osguthorpe agreements that were the subject of the litigation by Osguthorpe 
against ASC (which did not involve the SPA Agreement) violated a Ground Lease 
that was also being litigated in the case, the trial court ordered consolidation of 
the two separate Osguthorpe cases with the ASC/Wolf Mountain case. 
The district court did order, however, that Wolf Mountain and ASC were 
required to make reasonable arrangements so that Osguthorpe would not be 
burdened by the consolidation with respect to discovery between ASC and Wolf 
Mountain not related to the separate Osguthorpe agreements with Wolf Mountain 
and ASC (not the SPA Agreements). Osguthorpe never sent, received or 
participated in any discovery or motion practice regarding the separate litigation 
between Wolf Mountain and ASC regarding the SPA Agreement. 
The Summit County notice of default, issued July 20, 2009, was issued 
after the time for moving to amend pleadings in this consolidated action was 
closed under the Second Amended Case Management Order, entered on 
October 21, 2008, scheduling order (which cutoff date was March 16, 2009), R. 
2013-2028. On August 19, 2010, however, the trial court ordered that the parties 
supplement their pleadings with all claims which had arisen since the last 
pleading. R. 9192-9196. To avoid claim preclusion arguments, Osguthorpe filed 
such supplemental pleading as ordered by the Court, raising for the first time its 
SPA Agreement claims against ASC and Wolf Mountain arising from the 2009 
notice of default. Osguthorpe never had any desire to litigate such claims and, 
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more importantly, having never previously been required to examine the claims 
as part of drafting the supplemental pleading, never before realized that its own 
claims would be prejudiced absent a stay of the litigation and order compelling 
both ASC and Wolf Mountain to take all arbitrable disputes to arbitration with 
Osguthorpe and any other parties affected by the Summit County notice of 
default. 
Osguthorpe therefore moved to stay the litigation of all arbitrable disputes 
and to compel arbitration. The trial court set a hearing on that motion on 
November 24, 2010. This Court issued its Opinion in ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf 
Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT65, 245 P.3d 184 (2010) on Friday, November 
19, 2010. The next day, Saturday, November 20, 2010, the trial court struck the 
scheduled November 24 hearing and, without notice or opportunity for any 
hearing with respect to Osguthorpe's position on this Court's Opinion issued the 
prior day, the trial court denied Osguthorpe's motion. The following Monday, 
November 22,2010 Osguthorpe filed its appeal as allowed by the Utah 
Arbitration Act. 
Despite the appeal, the trial court, ASC and Wolf Mountain continued to 
move forward to litigate all the arbitrable issues despite the appeal which had 
been filed which, Osguthorpe argued, divested the trail court of jurisdiction over 
the arbitrable issues pending resolution of the appeal. Osguthorpe therefore 
sought a stay or injunction pending the outcome of the appeal under Rule 8 of the 
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Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (i.e., not under the Arbitration Act, as to which 
the propriety of the denial of a stay under that Act was on appeal). This Court 
issued its summary denial of a Rule 8 stay or injunction on January 20, 2011. 
Osguthorpe sought relief under the federal arbitration act in federal court, 
but after that court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, Osguthorpe 
filed a second motion to stay this action and to compel arbitration specifically 
under the federal arbitration act (an act which had been touched on but which 
had not been the procedural basis of relief requested in Osguthorpe's prior 
motion). R. 12249-12251. To the extent that Utah public policy interfered with 
Osguthorpe's right to arbitration under the federal arbitration act, Osguthorpe 
argued that Utah law was pre-empted. The trial court denied that motion and 
Osguthorpe again appealed. 
Despite the pendency of both appeals, the trial court, Wolf Mountain and 
ASC then proceeded to try all of the arbitrable issues to a jury and to obtain a jury 
verdict thereon, which was entered on April 26, 2011. R. 13129-13133. 
C. Brief Statement of the Facts of the Case 
1. In or about November 1999, Osguthorpe entered into an agreement 
entitled "Amended and Restated Development Agreement For ASC Specially 
Planned Area- Snyderville Basin, Summit County, Utah," a genuine copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit A [hereinafter the "SPA Agreement"]. 
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2. The SPA Agreement contains a mandatory binding arbitration clause 
which states broadly, in pertinent part: 
Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism contained 
herein shall not sufficiently resolve a dispute under this Amended 
Agreement, then every such continuing dispute, difference, and 
disagreement shall be referred to a single arbitrator agreed upon by 
the parties, or if no single arbitrator can be agreed up on, an arbitrator or 
arbitrators shall be selected in accordance with the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association and such dispute, difference, or disagreement shall 
be resolved by the binding decision of the arbitrator.... 
SPA Agreement, at 60, % 5.8.1 (emphasis added) [hereinafter "Arbitration 
Agreement"]. R. 12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4. 
3. The SPA Agreement governs the development of hundreds of acres 
in Summit County, Utah, some of which is owned by the out-of-state parties listed 
above, and includes the development of golf courses, hotels, condominiums and 
other "destination accommodations" and "resort support housing," commercial 
uses, and other facilities, amenities and programs. SPA Agreement, at 4-5. R. 
12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4. 
4. The SPA Agreement requires implementation of a transportation 
plan which includes "linkages to the Salt Lake City area, including the airport, via 
various forms of transit for employees and guests." SPA Agreement, at 4-5. R. 
12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4. 
5. The SPA Agreement requires that "[i]n addition to providing housing 
opportunities for seasonal residents and guests, the RVMA [another party to 
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the SPA Agreement] will construct rental housing and provide financial subsidies 
that will produce housing units for employees of The Resort and a portion of The 
Resort Community, as set forth elsewhere in this Amended Agreement." SPA 
Agreement, at 6 (emphasis added). R. 12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4 
6. The SPA Agreement includes within its scope "Timeshare Estate or 
Fractional Ownership Interest" residences as to which "[djuring their interval use, 
owners may, as prescribed in applicable Condominium Declarations, either 
occupy the unit, trade the use period for use in an exchange program, or rent the 
unit to the general public through the rental program operated by the rental 
manager used by the owners' association." SPA Agreement, at 13. R. 12252, 
Exhibit A, See Appendix 4 
7. The required construction of the golf course must be undertaken, 
according to the SPA Agreement, "to satisfy the County's [i.e., Summit County, 
another party to the SPA Agreement] requirement that ASC be a world class, all 
season resort" SPA Agreement, at 29, fl 3.2.6 (emphasis added). R. 12252, 
Exhibit A, See Appendix 4 
8. The RVMA, another party to the SPA Agreement, is required to 
prepare a Resort Competitiveness Analysis at least every five years 
to assess the position of The Resort and Resort Community 
versus other global businesses viewed as competitors. Such 
analysis will be undertaken with two markets in mind- short-term 
visitors to The Resort and resort property purchasers. The purpose 
of the analysis is to identify trends in the industry and anticipate 
and implement, when appropriate, programs, amenities and 
facilities, marketing strategies, real estate offerings, and, other 
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measures to capitalize on such trends and attract and retain 
customers. The RVMA will include the analysis in the Annual 
Review in these years that the analysis is undertaken. 
SPA Agreement, at 38, If 3.3.4(a)(3) (emphasis added). R. 12252, Exhibit A, See 
Appendix 4 
9. The SPA Agreement requires that all notices thereunder be sent 
through the United States mails, by certified mail, including to addresses in Maine 
and Texas. SPA Agreement, at 65-66,If 6.4. R. 12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 
4 
10. The SPA Agreement expressly provides "that the obligations 
imposed by this Amended Agreement are only such as are consistent with state 
and federal law." SPA Agreement, at 69, If 6.19. The SPA Agreement 
expressly recognizes that some of its provisions may be subject to invalidation if 
federal law is inconsistent with the requirements of the SPA Agreement and 
states that, in those circumstances, the SPA Agreement "shall be deemed 
amended to the extent necessary to make it consistent with . . . federal law." 
SPA Agreement, at 69,1f 6.19. R. 12252, Exhibit A, See Appendix 4. 
11. Following the court-ordered cut-off to amend pleadings, Summit 
County, on July 29, 2009, purporting to act under the SPA Agreement, issued its 
ostensible Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [hereinafter "Default Notice], 
declaring, inter alia, Osguthorpe, ASC, Wolf Mountain and others to have 
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defaulted under the SPA Agreement. See Default Notice, at 45-46. R. 1252, 
ExhibitH. 
12. The Default Notice purported to rescind all of Osguthorpe's 
entitlements provided under the SPA Agreement if the default were not cured by 
October 15, 2009. R. 1252, Exhibit H. 
13. Because Osguthorpe's claims under the SPA Agreement are 
premised in their entirety on defaults by ASC and Wolf Mountain in their 
performance under the SPA Agreement, Osguthorpe has a property right in the 
Arbitration Agreement under state law, the Federal Arbitration Act exists to 
enforce that property right, requiring all such disputes and issues to be resolved 
only through the contractual binding and mandatory arbitration mechanism which 
ASC, Wolf Mountain and other parties to the Arbitration Agreement agreed to 
pursue. 
14. Osguthorpe then argued to the trial court that it no longer had 
jurisdiction over any arbitrable issues because the filing of the Notice of Appeal 
divested the trial court of jurisdiction under Utah law and transferred it to the Utah 
Supreme Court in Case No. 20100928. See Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Ass'n v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305, 306-07 (Utah 1996) (holding that trial 
court has no jurisdiction to enter orders on any issues on appeal); accord 
McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 413 F.3d 1158,1160-62 (10th Cir. 
2005)("we are persuaded by the reasoning of the latter circuits that upon the filing 
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of a non-frivolous [interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to compel 
arbitration], the district court is divested of jurisdiction until the appeal is resolved 
on the merits.") 
15. Osguthorpe had never raised or litigated any arbitrable issue in the 
action until it filed its supplemental pleading on July 19, 2010. R. 8533-8546. 
Soon thereafter, based on the Arbitration Agreement Osguthorpe filed a motion to 
compel arbitration on September 29, 2010. R. 9482-9484. 
16. Judge Hilder issued a Ruling and Order (re Arbitration Issues) on 
November 20, 2010, which was filed on November 22, 2010, [hereinafter "Order 
Denying Arbitration"]. R. 10891-10901. 
17. In the Order Denying Arbitration, Judge Hilder did not find that the 
Arbitration Agreement was not valid or was not binding on Osguthorpe, ASC, 
Wolf Mountain or any other party thereto. See R. R. 10891-10901, passim. 
Judge Hilder did not find that the SPA Agreement disputes were not arbitrable 
issues that were the subject of the Arbitration Agreement. See R.10891-10901, 
passim. Judge Hilder further did not find any waiver by Osguthorpe of its 
contractual right under the Arbitration Agreement to have all arbitrable issues 
decided by way of arbitration. See R. R.10891-10901, passim. 
D. Summary of the Argument 
The SPA Agreement contains a mandatory and binding arbitration 
provision. ASC and Wolf Mountain each waived that provision and litigated for 
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years SPA Agreement disputes. Osguthorpe has claims under the SPA 
Agreement by virtue of ostensibly being placed in default by another of the 
thirty-six parties to the SPA Agreement, Summit County. Osguthorpe's claims 
include disputing the default but also seeking damages against Wolf Mountain 
and ASC for their own defaults thereunder, which were the cause of 
Osguthorpe's ostensible default. 
Osguthorpe has the contractual right to compel Wolf Mountain and ASC to 
resolve all such SPA Agreement issues in arbitration and, under the Utah 
Arbitration Act and the Federal Arbitration Act to have the Court enter an order 
compelling both of them to arbitrate all SPA Agreement disputes. Because the 
trial court proceeded to a jury verdict and judgment despite the pendency of 
Osguthorpe's appeal, part of the relief to which Osguthorpe is entitled is an Order 
from this Court vacating the jury verdict and judgment on the SPA Agreement 
issues and to Order that the issues be sent to arbitration. 
Also, the trial court denied Osguthorpe's right of due process by entering a 
ruling based on this Court's Opinion in ASC v. Wolf Mountain, issued the day 
previous to the trial court's ruling, and relying on that Opinion without notice to 
Osguthorpe or providing Osguthorpe with any meaningful opportunity to be heard 
as to the effect, if any, of that ruling on the existing law. The due process violation 
also requires vacation of the jury verdict and judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. T H E PUBLIC POLICY DETERMINATION OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE AND THE 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO ENFORCE VALID ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS IS PARAMOUNT AND MAY NOT B E SUBORDINATED TO A N Y 
OTHER PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. 
The Utah Arbitration Act, UTAH C O D E ANN. §§ 78-31 a-1 to -20 (1999) 
("UAA")1 and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 ("FAA") represent the 
binding legislative policy determinations of the Utah Legislature and the United 
States Congress concerning the paramount public policy of enforcing mandatory 
and binding arbitration agreements. In his concurring opinion in Latter v. Holsum 
Bread Co., 108 Utah 364,160 P.2d 421 (1945), Mr. Justice Wolfe accurately 
described the common law's judicial hostility to arbitration agreements, see 
generally id. at 424-27. 
Indeed, some twenty years earlier, "the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. 
S. C. §1 et seq., [was] enacted in 1925 as a response to judicial hostility to 
arbitration." CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, No. 10-948, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 
575, U.S. (January 10,2012). It is fair to assume, therefore, especially 
when account is taken of the limited role of the Court under the UAA, that the 
Utah Arbitration Act was enacted as a public policy response by the Utah 
Legislature to the same concerns about judicial hostility towards arbitration. 
1Osguthorpe cites to the prior version of the Utah Arbitration Act because it was 
the version in effect at the time the SPA Agreement was entered into. 
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The trial court here interpreted this Court's Opinion in ASC Utah, Inc. v. 
Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65, 245 P.3d 184 (2010) ("ASC v. Wolf) 
as subordinating the public policy of requiring courts to enforce valid arbitration 
agreements to the public policy of using arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive 
method of resolving disputes. ASC and Wolf Mountain, only two out of thirty-six 
parties to the SPA Agreement, decided to waive their arbitration rights, invoke the 
resources of the judicial system and litigate issues that were arbitrable under the 
SPA Agreement, for years. 
To the extent that the trial court felt that this Court's decision in ASC v. Wolf 
subordinated the legislatively-determined public policy of requiring courts to 
enforce valid agreements to arbitrate to the salutary, but secondary, public policy 
of the speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes, Osguthorpe believes that 
the trial court misread ASC v. Wolf. If, however, this Court did so hold, then its 
holding would conflict with, and is pre-empted by, the FAA. 
The United States Supreme Court was presented with just such a conflict 
between those two public policies in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 
213, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 84 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1985). The Court had no problem 
deciding that the incidental salutary benefit serving the public policy of speedy 
and inexpensive conflict resolution could not stand in the face of Congress' 
express public policy determination that courts must enforce valid mandatory 
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arbitration agreements, regardless of the waste, inefficiency and cost that might 
result: 
We conclude, however, on consideration of Congress' intent in 
passing the statute, that a court must compel arbitration of otherwise 
arbitrable claims, when a motion to compel arbitration is made. The 
legislative history of the Act establishes that the purpose 
behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of 
privately made agreements to arbitrate. We therefore reject the 
suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration A ct was to 
promote the expeditious resolution of claims This is not to 
say that Congress was blind to the potential benefit of the legislation 
for expedited resolution of disputes. Far from it, the House Report 
expressly observed: 
"It is practically appropriate that the action should be taken at 
this time when there is so much agitation against the 
costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be 
largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration 
agreements are made valid and enforceable." Id., at 2. 
Nonetheless, passage of the Act was motivated, first and 
foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into 
which parties had entered, and we must not overlook this 
principal objective when construing the statute, or allow the 
fortuitous impact of the Act on efficient dispute resolution to 
overshadow the underlying motivation. Indeed, this conclusion is 
compelled by the Court's recent holding in Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), in which 
we affirmed an order requiring enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement, even though the arbitration would result in bifurcated 
proceedings. That misfortune, we noted, "occurs because the 
relevant federal law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary 
to give effect to an arbitration agreement," id., at 20. See also id., at 
24-25 ("The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal 
law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration"). 
We therefore are not persuaded by the argument that the 
conflict between two goals of the Arbitration Act - enforcement of 
private agreements and encouragement of efficient and speedy 
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dispute resolution - must be resolved in favor of the latter in order to 
realize the intent of the drafters. The preeminent concern of 
Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements 
into which parties had entered, and that concern requires that 
we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result 
is "piecemeal" litigation, at least absent a countervailing policy 
manifested in another federal statute. [Citation omitted.] By 
compelling arbitration of state-law claims, a district court 
successfully protects the contractual rights of the parties and 
their rights under the Arbitration Act. 
Id. at 219-21 (emphasis added). 
The circumstances of the SPA Agreement are that there are thirty-six 
parties who have agreed to resolve "every such continuing dispute, 
difference, and disagreement' arising under the SPA Agreement through 
arbitration. SPA Agreement, at 60, If 5.8.1 (emphasis added). The fact that two 
of those thirty-six chose to grind through years of litigation and public resources 
does not, as the trial court held, stand in the way of any other of the thirty-four 
parties receiving the legislatively mandated judicial enforcement mechanisms to 
protect their own right to have the identical issues resolved not between two 
parties in a courtroom, but before an arbitrator. That is the right Osguthorpe 
sought to have enforced by the trial court and now respectfully asks this Court to 
enforce. The trial court's failure to do so and instead to allow proceedings to 
move forward to verdict and judgment was error and must be reversed. 
II. IF UTAH LAW DID IN FACT SUBORDINATE THE PUBLIC POLICY OF ENFORCING 
VALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS TO THE PUBLIC POLICY OF SPEEDY AND 
INEXPENSIVE RESOLUTIONS, THEN IT IS PRE-EMPTED BY THE FAA. 
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The United States Supreme Court has closed the door on the question of 
whether any state law in conflict with the FAA can survive- the answer is a 
resounding no- all such state law is pre-empted by 9 U.S.C. § 2. See Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,10-17, 104 S. Ct. 852, 79 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1984)(explaining pre-emption of conflicting state law by the FAA). The Court 
rejected the contention that state public policy could form any basis for not 
enforcing arbitration agreements. Id. at 16. 
III. BOTH THE UAA AND FAA REQUIRE ARBITRATION OF ALL SPA AGREEMENT 
ISSUES CONCERNING DISPUTES BETWEEN ASC AND WOLF MOUNTAIN- THEY 
AFFECT OSGUTHORPE'S SPA AGREEMENT DISPUTE. 
The arbitration clause at issue herein provides: 
Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism 
contained herein shall not sufficiently resolve a dispute under this 
Amended Agreement, then every such continuing dispute, 
difference, and disagreement shall be referred to a single 
arbitrator agreed upon by the parties, or if no single arbitrator can 
be agreed upon, an arbitrator or arbitrators shall be selected in 
accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association 
and such dispute, difference, or disagreement shall be resolved by 
the binding decision of the arbitrator.... 
SPA Agreement, at § 5.8.1 (emphasis added). In ruling on Wolf Mountain's 
Motion to Amend, regarding the alleged violations of the SPA Agreement by third 
parties, the trial court stated that "the SPA Agreement does require arbitration." 
April 29, 2009 Ruling and Order, at 18. R. 3082. The Court added: "Thus, any 
claim by Wolf that the SPA Agreement was violated in some way is subject to the 
mandatory arbitration provision in that agreement." R. 3098. 
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Once it is established that an agreement to arbitrate exists, which is 
undisputed here a presumption in favor of arbitration exists. Bybee v. Abdulla, 
2008 UT 35, TI27,189 P.3d 40, 47. Likewise, it is required that the arbitration 
clause be construed liberally in favor of arbitration. McCoy v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31, U 15, 20 P.3d 901, 904. Arbitration 
7s a remedy freely bargained for by the parties, and provides a means 
of giving effect to the intention of the parties If an arbitrable issue 
exists, the parties should not be deprived of the benefits of the 
agreement for which they bargained. 
Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, (Utah 1981) (emphasis 
added). "Arbitration is a contractual remedy for the settlement of disputes[.]" 
Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 2009 UT 54, % 13, 217 P.3d 
716, 720. "When the parties to a dispute have contracted to settle their dispute in 
arbitration, the role of the courts is extremely limited." Id., % 8, 217 P.3d at 719. 
"It is the policy of the law in Utah to interpret contracts in favor of 
arbitration, keeping with our policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution of 
disputes when the parties have not agreed to litigation." fieecf v. Davis County 
Sch. Dist, 892 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). "Arbitration is a matter of contract law[.j" Ellsworth v. American 
Arbitration Association, 2006 UT 77, U 14,148 P.3d 983, 987. Both ASC Utah 
and Wolf Mountain agreed with the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership that 
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"every such continuing dispute, difference, and disagreement" which was not 
sufficiently resolved by the "default mechanism" in the SPA agreement. 
The default mechanism was invoked by Summit County in 2009 and that 
default mechanism did not resolve the defaults of ASC Utah or Wolf Mountain or 
Osguthorpe's dispute over whether its entitlements should have been stripped or 
whether the breaches by ASC and Wolf Mountain were the cause of such 
entitlements being stripped. The jury verdict form, itself, established beyond any 
question that the SPA Agreement issues were actually litigated after 
Osguthorpe's motion was denied, because special findings were entered on the 
questions of whether both ASC and Wolf Mountain breached the SPA 
Agreement. R. 13129-13133. Those are arbitrable issues, the resolution of which 
could establish liability to Osguthorpe by both ASC and Wolf Mountain if the 
arbitrator decides that they both caused delays in Osguthorpe's performance 
under the SPA Agreement through their own delays. 
Once a mandatory and binding arbitration agreement is determined to exist 
under the SPA Agreement all the SPA Agreement issues that could relate to the 
Osguthorpe claims against ASC, Wolf Mountain and other parties to the SPA 
Agreement are arbitrable, the trial court had no discretion and it was required to 
compel arbitration of all claims and issues relating to the SPA. McCoy v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31 fl ("Where the evidence relating to a 
purported agreement to arbitrate is undisputed, the district court has no discretion 
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under the statute. It must compel arbitration."). Under current Utah law, upon 
ordering arbitration, the Court "on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding 
that involves a claim subject to the arbitration." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-11-
108(7). Under the 1999 Act, "[a]n order to submit an agreement to arbitration 
stays any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the 
agreement." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-4(3) (1999). 
Federal law is the same. FAA § 3 requires that "upon being satisfied that 
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration" the Court 
"shal l . . . stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay 
is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration." Id. It is clear that if any issue 
is referable to arbitration then a stay must be entered as to every issue related in 
any way to the arbitration. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Infinity Financial 
Group, LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1330,1332 (S.D. Fla. 1999)("For arbitrable issues, 
the language of [9 U.S.C. § 3] indicates that the stay is mandatory.")(quoting Klay 
v. All Defendants, 389 F.3d 1191,1203-04 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
The United States Supreme Court explained that "the [Federal Arbitration 
Act] not only 'declared a national policy favoring arbitration' but actually 
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution 
of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.'" 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,10, 104 S. Ct. 852, 79 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984) 
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(emphasis added). The Court further held that the FAA "created a body of 
federal substantive law," which was "applicable in state and federal courts." Id. 
(emphasis added). "Congress has . . . mandated the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements." Id., 465 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added). The Court explicitly 
announced the only two limitations on that Congressional mandate: 
We discern only two limitations on the enforceability of arbitration 
provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration Act: they must be part 
of a written maritime contract or a contract "evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce" and such clauses may be revoked upon 
"grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract." We see nothing in the Act indicating that the broad 
principle of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under 
state law. 
Id. at 10-11. Further, the Federal Arbitration Act applies to proceedings in the 
state courts and "[ujnder the FAA, state courts as well as federal courts are 
obliged to honor and enforce agreements to arbitrate." Vaden v. Discover 
Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262,173 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2009)(citing Southland, at 12) 
(emphasis added). 
The Court was clear in explaining Congress' intent in reaching that 
determination. Parties who enter into arbitration agreements are free to negotiate 
the terms of the agreements, and enter such agreements voluntarily. The Court 
stated: 
But it does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate under different rules than those set 
forth in the Act itself. Indeed, such a result would be quite 
inimical to the FAA's primary purpose of ensuring that 
26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to 
their terms. Arbitration under the Act is a matter of 
consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to 
structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just 
as they may limit by contract the issues which they will 
arbitrate, see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444, 105 S. 
Ct. 3346 (1985), so too may they specify by contract the rules 
under which that arbitration will be conducted. 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57,115 S. Ct. 1212, 
131 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1995). All of the parties to the SPA Agreement, including both 
ASC and Wolf Mountain, agreed to resolve "every such continuing dispute, 
difference, and disagreement' arising under the SPA Agreement through 
arbitration. SPA Agreement, at 60,1f 5.8.1. 
It is well-settled that under the FAA, all doubts as to arbitrability must be 
resolved in favor of arbitrability. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S. Ct. 3346, 87.L.Ed. 2d 444 
(1985). A strong presumption exists in determining the scope of arbitration 
provisions in favor of arbitrability: 
If a contract has a broad, sweeping arbitration clause, it is presumed 
that disputes will be arbitrated. [ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 
45 F.3d 1455,1462 (10th Cir. 1995)]. A party may overcome this 
presumption "only if'it may be said with positive assurance that the 
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers 
the asserted dispute.'" Id. (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns 
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650, 106 S. Ct. 1415, 89 L Ed. 2d 
648 (1986)). We resolve any doubts in favor of arbitrability. Litton 
Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 209, 111 S. Ct. 2215, 115 
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L. Ed. 2d 177 (1991); Hollern, 458 F.3d at 1173 ("In assessing the 
scope of the arbitrators' authority, we are mindful of the strong 
presumption requiring all doubts concerning whether a matter is 
within the arbitrators' powers to be resolved in favor of arbitrability.") 
Hicks v. CadleCo., Nos. 08-1306, 1307,1429 & 1435, 355 Fed. Appx. 186, 192, 
2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 26523, at **13-14 (10th Cir. December 7, 2009) 
(unpublished decision). 
The United States Supreme Court has explained the significant distinction 
between the question of who should arbitrate arbitrability and the question of 
whether the dispute is within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement in First 
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 131 L 
Ed. 2d 985 (1995). The Court explained: 
This Court, however, has (as we just said) added an important 
qualification, applicable when courts decide whether a party 
has agreed that arbitrators should decide arbitrability: Courts 
should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability unless there is "clea[rj and unmistakabl[e]" 
evidence that they did so. AT&T Technologies, supra, at 649; 
see Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 583, n.7. In this manner the law 
treats silence or ambiguity about the question "who (primarily) 
should decide arbitrability" differently from the way it treats 
silence or ambiguity about the question "whether a particular 
merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it is within the 
scope of a valid arbitration agreement" -- for in respect to 
this latter question the law reverses the presumption. 
Id. at 944-45 (emphasis added). In the case at hand, "who" should decide 
arbitrability is not in issue- the court. The question of whether an issue falls 
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within the scope of the arbitration clause falls squarely into the presumption of 
arbitrability. 
And as to that presumption, it is also clear that "'"procedural" questions 
which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition' are presumptively 
not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide." Howsam v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84,123 S. Ct. 588,154 L Ed. 2d 491 (2002) 
(quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557,11 L. Ed. 2d 
898, 84 S. Ct. 909 (1964)). In this circumstance, those "procedural" questions 
include all questions pertaining to the validity or invalidity of Summit County's 
issuance its Default Notice, which questions are answered in part by the 
determination of the exact issues this court is about to try to a jury. Arbitration 
clauses must be construed broadly and all doubts about arbitrability must be 
resolved in favor of arbitration. See National American Insurance Co. v. SCOR 
Reinsurance Co., 362 F.3d 1288, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004). The role of the court is 
limited: 
This section [9 U.S.C. § 2] announces "a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements." Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83, 123 S. Ct. 588, 154 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2002) 
(quotations omitted). Accordingly, "arbitration is a matter of contract" 
in which courts have a limited role. Id. In that limited role, courts do 
not have authority to decide questions explicitly addressed by the 
arbitration agreement. Id. Rather, courts are bound by the terms of 
the agreement and may only decide questions of arbitrability- that is, 
whether the parties have agreed to submit a specific dispute to 
arbitration- "in the kind of narrow circumstance where contracting 
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parties would likely have expected a court to have decided the 
gateway matter." Id. 
Shell Oil Co. v. Co2Comm., Inc., 589 F.3d 1105,1108 (10th Cir. 2009). Upon 
finding a valid arbitration agreement, the court has no discretion but to compel 
arbitration and issue a stay: 
The FAA provides that contractual agreements to arbitrate disputes 
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. The purpose of the Act is "to place an 
arbitration agreement upon the same footing as other contracts and 
to overturn the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate." Glass v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 114 
F.3d 446, 451 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
FAA is a "congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S. Ct. 927, 74 L. Ed. 2d 
765(1983). 
Hill v. Ricoh Americas Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 770-71 (10th Cir. 2010). 
ASC argued below that certain conditions precedent to the right to initiate 
arbitration have not yet occurred and so the motion to compel arbitration should 
have been denied. It is wrong. It is entirely for the arbitrators to determine 
questions about issues of procedural, as opposed to substantive, arbitrability, 
such as conditions precedent. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 
79, 85, 123 S. Ct. 588,154 L Ed. 2d 491 (2002) (holding that "in the absence of 
an agreement to the contrary, issues of substantive arbitrability . . . are for a court 
to decide and issues of procedural arbitrability, i.e., whether prerequisites such as 
time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions precedent to an 
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obligation to arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators to decide" (quoting 
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 (RUAA) § 6© cmt. 2) (emphasis 
added & in original)). 
Summit County purported to place Osguthorpe in default. Regardless of 
whether ASC, which was also placed in default, later became, as it alleged, 
undefaulted (another issue for the arbitrators), Osguthorpe has ostensibly been 
stripped by the County of all of its entitlements and is entitled to have all issues 
related to breaches that may have led to Summit County's action under the SPA 
Agreement sent to arbitration. 
IV. OSGUTHORPE WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS. 
A hearing had been set on Osguthorpe's motion to compel arbitration and 
to stay proceedings. That motion was stricken after the trial court, on the 
Saturday following this Court's Friday issuance of its Opinion in ASC v. Wolf 
Mountain, sua sponte ruled on Osguthorpe's motion. Under the due process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, § 7 of the Utah Constitution, 
Osguthorpe is entitled to receive due process of law. 
"The Utah Constitution, like the federal constitution, prohibits the state from 
depriving any person of "life, liberty or property, without due process of law." We 
have previously explained that "[t]he bare essentials of due process . . . mandate 
adequate notice to those with an interest in [a proceeding] and an opportunity for 
them to be heard in a meaningful manner." Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n v. 
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Atherton, 2011 UT 58, H10 (quoting Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco 
Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT 17, U 28, 156 P.3d 782). Where due process has not 
been provided by the trial court, the judgment (and here, verdict) must be vacated 
and the case remanded. See/'d., at U 17. 
Here, the trial court based its ruling entirely on what it characterized as the 
"sea change" in Utah law created by this Court's Opinion issued the day before. 
This ruling stated: "Osguthorpes' essential argument is that 'this Court has no 
discretion and must compel arbitration of all claims and issues relating to the 
S P A . ' . . . The argument is supported by case law, and had some force, until 
yesterday. The discussion above shows how the landscape has changed." R. 
10898. This ruling. Based on the prior day's Opinion from this Court, was entered 
without any notice to Osguthorpe or any meaningful opportunity for Osguthorpe to 
argue whether and to what extent the landscape had changed, if at all. 
Osguthorpe therefore received no due process and it respectfully asks that the 
entire jury verdict and judgment be set aside and the case remanded. 
V. T H E VERDICT AND JUDGMENT MUST B E VACATED, THE SPA AGREEMENT 
ISSUES COMPELLED TO ARBITRATION AND THE ACTION STAYED PENDING 
ARBITRATION. 
The vacating of improperly entered judgments occurs routinely as cases 
are sent back for new trials. The remedy for the error in failing to compel 
arbitration and to stay litigation is no different. The jury's verdict must be vacated, 
the judgment set aside and the all SPA Agreement issues sent to arbitration. This 
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Court has previously employed such a remedy with respect to a case that had 
been litigated to judgment in the district court before another party to the 
arbitration agreement demanded arbitration. In Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, 
982 P.2d 572, Dr. Pledger had provided services to his patient, Mrs. Gillespie. Id 
at 574, If 2. Mrs. Gillespie's husband was a participant under his employer's 
qualified health insurance plan, provided by Cigna Healthplan, and so his wife, 
Mrs. Gillespie, was covered by the plan. Id. Mrs. Gillespie did not pay Dr. 
Pledger because she believed the bill would be paid for by Cigna Healthplan. Id., 
f 3. Dr. Pledger moved for summary judgment, which was granted before Cigna 
Healthplan could be served with a third-party complaint. Id., fflj 6-7. Once Cigna 
Healthplan was served, it investigated the claim and engaged in contractually-
required efforts to resolve the dispute without litigation, for a period of two years, 
/cf. at 574-75, ITIf 8-10. 
After determining that the dispute could not be resolved, Cigna Healthplan 
moved the district court to set aside or stay the judgment against Mrs. Gillespie 
and to compel the entire dispute to arbitration. Id. The district court refused. Id. 
Cigna Healthplan appealed and the Utah Supreme Court held that, since Cigna 
Healthplan had not waived its own right to arbitration, the already fully-litigated 
judgment obtained by Dr. Pledger against Mrs. Gillespie must be set aside and 
the entire dispute ordered to arbitration. Id. at 578, U 24. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Osguthorpe respectfully requests that the Jury's 
verdict on all issues relating to the SPA Agreement and the judgment entered 
thereon be completely vacated and all SPA Agreement-related issues be ordered 
to arbitration and the action stayed pending the conclusion of such arbitration. 




Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DJ4$gE$£ft|CT COURT -SUMMIT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SILVER SUMMIT DEPARTMENT 2010 NOV 22 AH !D" 52 
ASC UTAH, INC., a Haine 
corporation, dba THE CANYONS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L . C , k 
Utah limited liability company, 
FILED BY. :£&. 
RULING AND ORDER 
(ARBITRATION ISSUES) 
Consolidated 
Case No. 060500297 
Defendant. Judge Robert K. Hilder 




ASC UTAH,, etc., et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 060500404 
STEPHEN A. OSGUSTHORPE, etc., et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L . C , 
Defendant. 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Personal 
representative of the Estate of 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., 
Case No. 070500018 
(Transferred from Salt Lake 
Dept., # 060913348) 
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Intervener. 
STEPHEN A. OSGOTHORPE, etc., et al.f 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. 0705D0520 
ASC UTAH, INC.; AMERICAN SKIING 
COMPANY; and LESLIE B > OTTENS, 
Defendants. . 
Wolf Mountain (uWolf") filed its third Motion to Compel 
Arbitration in August, 2010. The Osguthorpes, plaintiffs in Case No. 
070500520, filed their first Motion to Compel Arbitration in 
September, 20.10. Both Motions are premised on the arbitration 
provision contained in the 1999 SPA Agreement. The Motions have been 
fully briefed and ready for decision for some time, but for reasons 
that need not be recited, scheduled hearings were continued, and on 
November 3, 2010, Judge Kelly entered his recusal Order in response to 
Wolf's Rule 63(b), URCP, Motion to Disqualify. I assumed 
responsibility for the case on November 10, 2010. 
* On November 16, 2010 the court met with counsel to plan the 
future course of this case. On that day the court scheduled oral 
argument on both Motions to Compel Arbitration on Wednesday November 
24, 2010- Since November 16; however, two things have occurred that 
eliminate the need for a hearing on the arbitration motions: The court 
has read all of the briefing related to both motions, and on November 
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19, 2010, the Utah Supreme Court issued its full decision affirming . 
Judge Lubeck's (a predecessor judge on this case) decision denying 
Wolf's earlier motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court had 
issued a summary affirmance on July 22, 2010, but until yesterday, the 
bases for that affirmance had not been stated. 
As the court and counsel discussed on November 16, there are many 
motions awaiting decision in this case, some of which have been 
pending for many months, and not all of those motions necessarily 
require argument. Certainly, Rule 7, URCP, which governs motion 
practice, does not require argument for these non-dispositive 
arbitration motions. Rule 7(e). Even in the case of dispositive 
motions, the court may refuse argument if it finds that "the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been 
authoritatively decided." Id. 
When the court scheduled argument, it had not read the filings, 
and of course it had not seen the Supreme Court decision. Now having 
had the opportunity to do both, the court finds that the arbitration 
issue in this case has been as authoritatively decided as one could 
imagine, and both Motions must therefore be DENIED, albeit for some 
different reasons. Accordingly, the scheduled hearing on arbitration 
motions is hereby STRICKEN, but counsel are advised that the hearing 
on the Motion to Change Venue will proceed as scheduled. The court 
addresses each Motion in turn: 
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jftfe\ ^ 
WOLF MOUNTAIN MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 
The bases for Wolf's Motion can be summarized as follows: 
. 1. An agreement to arbitrate is contained in the SPA Agreement. 
2. Arbitration is mandatory if an enforceable agreement exists. 
3. Arbitration is favored as the public policy of this state, and 
by compelling arbitration judicial resources will be conserved. 
Addressing each in order, the court certainly agrees, as did 
Judge Lubeck, that the SPA Agreement contains an arbitration 
provision-and it has done so since 1999. That is, it is not recent 
news to any party to these actions, notwithstanding that Wolf has 
argued that it was not aware of its right to arbitrate until Judge 
Lubeck issued his April 29, 2009, order. The Supreme Court has now 
specifically considered, and rejected, that argument. ASC Utah, Inc. 
V. Wolf Mountain resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65, Hf 26-28 (November 19, 
2010). 
Second, a waiver exception to the mandatory character of 
arbitration agreements has existed since at least Chandler v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992), and now in 
ASC Utah the Supreme Court has removed any doubt whether the 
arbitration statute prevents courts from refusing to enforce 
arbitration agreements: The arbitration statute that controls this 
case, Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4, is neither mandatory nor 
jurisdictional. 2010 UT 65 at ^ 13-21. 
Much is written in memoranda supporting motions to compel 
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arbitration-not just in this case, but commonly in this court's 
experience-about the salutary purposes and features of. arbitration 
(the "just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes")that 
require enforcement of such agreements. Those benefits may indeed be 
present when arbitration agreements are bargained for, and the parties 
promptly exfcrcise their rights to arbitrate, but the Supreme Court has 
now squarely faced the circumstances where arbitration clauses are 
used in a way that, in fact, defeats the positive features that may 
otherwise exist: 
The legislature enacted the Act in accordance with a public 
policy that favors arbitration as contractual agreements between 
parties not to litigate, [citation omitted] only insofar as they 
serve as "speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating 
disputes, [citation omitted] and help reduce strain on judicial 
resources, [citation omitted] . There is no public -policy 
supporting arbitration when it would undermine these goals. 
Id. at H 18 (emphasis added) . 
This court could take time and pages explaining why this case may 
be a prime example of misuse of the existence of an arbitration 
provision/ but in fact the Supreme Court engages in that exercise, 
specifically addressing this case, and repetition avails little. 
Third, this court touches on the conservation of judicial 
resources issue, because Wolf has chosen to include this possibility 
as a basis for enforcing arbitration, albeit in a one line 
declaration, without explanation or factual support: wThe arbitration 
will conserve judicial resources and be less expensive for the 
parties." (Wolf memorandum in support at 3). 
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How? As this court has recently commented to counsel, this case 
(or more correctly, these cases) have proven to be one of the greatest 
consumers of the resources of the Third District Court in many years. 
The litigation has consumed years of intensive court involvement, 
voluminous motion practice, extensive discovery, and even substantial 
physical resources as basic as paper, copy toner, and storage space. 
This consolidated case comprises more file volumes than any presently 
pending case in this District that serves more than one million 
citizens of this state. It is also now on its third judge and fourth 
or fifth law clerk. It is maybe five or six weeks from a five week 
trial-it is certainly very close to a long trial, whenever it may 
actually commence-but the point is that court resources have already 
been consumed almost to exhaustion. This court cannot see how the 
jettisoning of much or all of that work and expense (Wolf says that: 
vThe arbitration herein will likely resolve all of the disputes 
presently found in this case") will somehow conserve resources. What 
such a course will do, at best, is waste resources, burden parties 
with further enormous costs, and delay resolution-all counter to the 
policies underlying the arbitration model. 
The conclusive point i3 that the Supreme Court has found (1) 
arbitration is not mandatory, and (2) this case presents a clear case 
of waiver on the part of Wolf. That is now the law of this case, and 
the mandate from the appellate court. This court could not decide 
otherwise if it wished, but certainly no reason has been advanced why 
6 ' 
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there should be any other outcome. 
Again, this court cannot state the bases for finding waiver by 
Wolf, and prejudice to ASCU, better than the Supreme Court has already 
done. See, 2010 UT 65 at Hf 29-36. 
Wolf may argue that the court has not considered its position 
that it now seeks arbitration of new claims, as asserted by ASCU by 
leave of court, pursuant to Rule 15(d), URCP. The court, however, 
agrees with ASCU that the claims not new, but supplements, addressing 
new alleged actions since the original pleadings were closed. Even if 
that is not so, the door to arbitration in this case has been slammed 
shut because of the conduct of the parties, through their intensive 
engagement in the litigation process, and the resulting irreparable 
harm to any objective at this date, sincere or not, to engage in 
arbitration to reap the benefits that may have been available through 
that process years ago when all started down this litigation path. 
This court sums up with words from Chief Justice Durham's 
conclusion: 
Utah public policy favors arbitration agreements only 
insofar as they provide a speedy and inexpensive means of-
adjudicating disputes, and reduce strain on judicial resources. 
In this case, enforcing the arbitration agreement would undercut 
both policy rationales: arbitration at this point would be 
neither a" speedy and inexpensive way to adjudicate this dispute, 
nor a means of reducing strain on judicial resources. 
2010 UT 65 at t 40. 
For all of the reasons stated herein, and even more to the point, 
stated in the Utah Supreme Court's decision issued yesterday, Wolf 
7 
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Mountain's third Motion to Compel Arbitration is hereby DENIED. 
OSGUTHORPES' MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 
The Osguthorpe plaintiff are situated differently from Wolf for 
several reasons, but not so differently that they can compel 
arbitration of any claims or defenses in this consolidated action. 
Even if Osguthorpes have newly asserted claims or defenses for which 
they may not be fairly said to have waived any right, to arbitrate, a 
point this court does not decide in the context of the present motion, 
the policies underlying arbitration have been so violated in this case 
that arbitration is not an option open to any party. The Supreme Court 
has so decided, and even if this court did not agree (which, of 
course, it adamantly does), the mandate rule leaves no room for a 
different result. IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc., 
196 P.3d 588(Utah 2008). 
Osguthorpes' essential argument is that "this Court has no 
discretion and must compel arbitration of all claims and issues 
relating to the SPA." (Memorandum in support at 6) . The argument is 
supported by case law, and had ,some force, until yesterday. The 
discussion above shows how the landscape has changed. This court must 
DENY Osguthorpes' Motion to Compel Arbitration, but it does so fully 
recognizing that Osguthorpes have an option not available to Wolf 
Mountain. 
That is> Osguthorpes' Motion was prompted by the court's ruling 
re-opening the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(d), URCP. Osguthorpes' 
8 
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felt compelled to assert claims at that time, whether they wanted to 
or not, at the peril of losing any right to assert such claims
 xin the 
future. During his last hearing in this case, on October 27, 2010, 
Judge Kelly apparently recognized that Osguthorpes' supplemental 
pleadings had created some unforeseen consequences, and on his own 
motion, he first bifurcated, then dismissed those pleadings, without 
prejudice to re-filing. No order to that effect has been entered, and 
Judge Kelly left the door open for objections to his oral order, 
This court now vacates Judge Kelly's oral ruling regarding 
Osguthorpes' supplemental claims, and grants the Osguthorpe plaintiff 
leave, at their option, to continue with the claims in this case, or 
dismiss the claims (or any of them) without prejudice to re-filing 
within a reasonable time after this case is adjudicated through a 
final and appealable judgment, within any applicable statute of 
limitations, or no later than six months after final judgment, 
whichever occurs last. This ruling does not preclude any statute of 
limitations defense available to any party if the statute has run 
before the claims were filed in this case. Osguthorpes are granted 
twenty days from today to make their election as provided herein. 
The foregoing ruling does not include a determination that 
Osguthorpes' will have an arbitration option in any future filing.1 
1
 This court does reject Osguthorpes' insistence that their right to arbitrate any SPA 
Agreement claims was determined by Judge Lubeck and presumably affirmed by the Supreme 
Court. First, all Judge Lubeck's language did was agree that the SPA Agreement includes an 
arbitration provision, which it does. He then went on to find that provision was waived by Wolf 
9 
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^ 
That issue is reserved for future determination by the assigned court. 
What this court states without question is that any claims the 
Osguthorpes maintain in these consolidated cases will be litigated, 
not arbitrated, for all of the reasons set forth herein and in the 
Utah Supreme Court decision at 2010 UT 65. 
As to the matters decided herein, this Ruling is the Order of the 
court and no further Order is required. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2010. 
By the Court: 
Robert K. Hilder ^** /^ ..r.^ .*i?a? r^  ... 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
Mountain, which ruling has been affirmed by the court of last resort. Second, in a later order, 
Judge Lubeck stated that: "This court did not rule... that Wolf [Mountain] MUST or COULD 
or SHOULD arbitrate " This language is taken as quoted in the Supreme Court decision at fl 
9. Accordingly, the mandate rule has no application on this point. 
10 
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Tb'vi Judicial District 
APR 12 2011 
SALI UKfc COUNTV 
ay. 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT O F THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE O F UTAH 
STEPHEN A. OSGUTHORPE, individually 
and in his capacity as Interim 
Personal Representative of the Estate 
of D A Osguthorpe, D.V.S. and also 
in his capacity as Successor Trustee 
of The Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe Trust; 




ASC UTAH, INC.; AMERICAN SKIING 
COMPANY; LESLIE B. OTTEN; WOLF 
MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C.; AND JOHN 
DOES I THROUGH XX, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION A C T FOR ORDER 
COMPELLING ARBITRATION AND FOR 
IMMEDIATE STAY AND DISMISSING 
CLAIMED ARBITRABLE ISSUES WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE 
Consolidated Case No. 060500297 
(Original Case No. 070500520 CN) 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder 
The Court, having fully considered Plaintiff D. A. Osguthorpe Family 
Partnership's Motion Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act for Order Compelling 
Arbitration and for Immediate Stay, being now fully advised in the premises, and good 
cause appearing for all the reasons stated on the record during the hearing on Monday, 
March 6,2011, by and through its undersigned counsel, 
IT IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff D. A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership's Motion 
Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act for Order Compelling Arbitration and for 
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Immediate Stay be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. Furthermore, for the reasons 
stated on the record during the hearing, any claim of the Osguthorpes that in any way 
relates to an alleged breach of the SPA Agreement is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE. 
DATED this 12th day of April, 2011. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDIfj 






ASC UTAH, INC.; a Maine 
corporation, d/b/a THE CANYONS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company 
Defendant. 
RULING and ORDER 
Consolidated Case 
No. 060500297 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: April 29, 2008 
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ASC UTAH, INC., et .al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 060500404 
STEPHEN A. OSGUTHORPE, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, L.C. 
Defendant. • 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of ENOCH SMITH, JR., 
Case No. 070500018 
(Transferred from Salt 
Lake Dept. #060913348) 
Intervenor. 
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STEPHEN A. OSGUTHORPE, et al., 
• Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ASC UTAH-, INC., -et al., • 
Defendants. 
Case No. 070500520 
The above matter came before the court on April 24, 2009 for 
oral argument on ASCU's motion to strike Wolf Mountain's third 
party complaint and unrelated cross claims in case no. 070500520 
and third parties' motion to dismiss and defendant's motion for 
leave to amend. Also heard were the motions of GECC and IHC to 
dismiss. 
Plaintiffs ASCU and ASC (ASCU) were present through John R. 
Lund, Kara L. Pettit, John Ashton and Clark Taylor, Wolf was 
present through Victoria C. Fitlow, Osguthorpe was not present, 
Krofcheck and others (The English Inn, Fairway Springs, White 
Pine Development, Deerpath Development, Forum Development, Paul 
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hereinafter Krofcheck) were present through Jason D. Boren, IHC 
Health Services (IHC) was present through David L. Mortensen and 
Lauren Sherman, General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC) was 
present through Kenneth W. Yeates and Kyle C. Thompson, and 
Smiths were present through Robert G. Wing. 
ASCU filed their motion on March 2, 2009. Wolf filed an 
opposition response.and its motion for leave to-amend on March 
12, 2009. Krofcheck, third party defendants, joined in 
plaintiffs' motion on March 18, 2009. GECC on March 24, 2009, 
joined ASCO's motion to strike, and filed its own motion to 
strike and dismiss and alternatively for a more definite 
statement. ASCU filed a reply on March 26, 2009, and an 
opposition to the motion of Wolf to amend. A request to submit 
was filed that same day. Based thereon oral argument was 
scheduled. 
Thereafter IHC joined in the ASCU motion and filed its own 
motion to dismiss on March 27, 2009. On April 13, 2009, the court 
granted Wolf's request to file a consolidated response to the 
motions of the third parties to dismiss. Evidently the parties 
received that but it was not filed with the court until the " 
morning of this hearing, April 24, 2009. GECC filed a reply in 
support of its motion to dismiss or for more definite statement 
"on" April"21," "2"0097*" "KroTch'ec'FTiTecT"a Teply~TrTsupport' '61" it"s 
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motion to strike and dismiss on April 22, 2009, and a request to 
submit on April 21, 2009, Also on April 22, 2009, ASCU joined in 
GECC's motion to dismiss. IHC filed a reply in support of its 
motion to dismiss on April 23, 2009. 
Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under 
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered 
the memoranda and other materials that had been submitted by the 
parties. Some of the pleadings were not filed until the day of 
the hearing or one or two days previous. Since taking the 
issues under advisement, the court has further considered the law 
and facts relating to the issues and the latest filed pleadings. 
Now being fully advised, the court renders the following Ruling 
and Order. 
BACKGROUND 
As can be seen' from the headings of the case, this matter 
involves the consolidated claims of several parties. This case 
also has considerable background and the court has set forth that 
background in several previous rulings. 
However, the court will attempt to provide the pertinent 
background to the pending motions. 
.On July 28, 2006, ASCU filed its First Amended Complaint 
"a^ aiTTs't:"' Wolf~ a'lTe'gl*ng"~ numel:^ ""act"idn"*arising from a* 
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long history of disputes between the two entities, including 
claims related to Wolf's alleged actions delaying construction of 
a golf course development within The Canyons SPA. 
On September 21, 2006, in response to ASCU's amended 
complain, Wolf filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied by 
this court. On December 18, 2006, Wolf filed its answer and 
counterclaims. Wolf's counterclaims against ASCU included 
various breach of contract and tort claims related to ASCU's 
alleged failure to fulfill its development obligations under the 
SPA Agreement, including the golf course. 
On December 19, 2006, Wolf filed its own First Amended 
Complaint in case no. 060500404, which was almost identical to 
Wolf's counterclaims against ASCU in case no. 060500297. In 
addition to numerous other allegations, Wolf again asserted that 
the ASC parties, herein ASCU, breached the Ground Lease and SPA 
Agreement with respect to their obligations to build a golf 
course. Wolf also asserted that the GECC leasehold mortgages 
were improper. 
On August 25, 2008, the Osguthorpe parties filed a First 
Amended Complaint in case no. 070500520, essentially combining a 
myriad of existing claims from three different cases into one 
complaint. In addition to claiming fraud against ASCU for 
asserting false authority to enter into an agreement with the 
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Osguthorpes failed to receive the consideration bargained for in 
their agreements with Wolf and ASCU for use of their property for 
the operation of The Canyons ski resort. 
On August 26, 2008, a hearing was held before this court at 
which the parties, including Wolf, agreed to and were ordered to 
answer the Osguthorpes' amended complaint within 30 days. This 
court also issued a ruling, as a result of the hearing, ordering 
discovery to move forward and for the parties to make dates 
available in October and November 2008 for depositions* 
On September 24,.2008, ASCU served its answer to the 
Osguthorpe complaint within the time agreed upon with this court. 
On October 21, 2008, this court entered a second .amended case 
management order. The order provided that all fact discovery was 
to be completed by July 1, 2009, and that the parties be allowed 
no more than fifteen depositions absent leave of the court. 
On October 27, 2008, due to Wolf's alleged lack of 
cooperation in providing dates- in October and November for 
depositions as ordered, ASCU filed a motion to compel the 
deposition of Mr. Griswold. The court withheld ruling on the 
motion and ordered that a special master be appointed to assist 
in moving discovery forward• 
On November 24, 2008, ASCU sent a subpoena to appear and 
provide testimony at deposition to Kenny Griswold. Mr. 
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Los Angeles, California. On January 30, 2009, Wolf filed its 
response to the Osguthorpe complaint. The filing of the answer 
was four months after the deadline established by the court. 
Wolf's response includes cross-claims against ASCU and Enoch 
Smith, as well as a third party complaint against the D.A. 
Osguthorpe Family Partnership and eleven other defendants, whom 
have had no previous involvement in any of these consolidated 
matters. Wolf's cross-claims and third party complaint are the 
subject of the motions before the court. 
ARGUMENTS 
ASCU'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND WOLF'S MOTION TO AMEND. 
ASCU argues that Wolf's cross claims and third party 
complaint was improperly attached to its answer to the Osguthorpe 
complaint. ASCU argues, that under Rule 14, URCP, a defendant may 
bring claims against a non-party who is or may be liable to him 
for all or part of plaintiff's claims; however, Wolf does not 
assert that the third party defendants are liable to Wolf but 
Wolf seeks contribution from them, which is not permitted under 
the rule or Utah law. 
ASCU further argues that Wolf's third party complaint was 
due by December 30, 2006, under Rule 14, URCP, and since it was 
not filed until January 30, 2009 the filing is untimely and 
"cTaiiii"*3~r~"4]" 5," "ITn^ that"'"' 
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any portion of the' cross-claim that does not relate to the 
Osguthorpes'. claims against Wolf should be stricken under Rule 
13(f), URCP. 
AS CO argues the pleading of Wolf should be stricken because 
it does nothing more than cause delay and prejudice to ASCU, as 
well as the other third party defendants. There is no reason it 
was filed.so late as Wolf knew at least as early as October 2007 
of the claimed event that triggered the filing of these cross and 
third party claims. Since then substantial discovery, over' 
110,000 pages of material, have been produced, 7 depositions have 
occurred and approximately 20 more are set in May and June 2009. 
In addition, ASCU argues that Utah.law does not permit 
claims for contribution unless such right is conferred by 
contract and since that is not the case here, Wolf's third claim 
for contribution fails. ASCU further argues Wolf's third party, 
claims for relief should be raised in either Wolf v. Summit 
County, 070500597, or in a wholly new-matter since Wolf seeks 
specific performance of the SPA Agreement which relate to the 
Wolf v. Summit County case. Finally, ASCU argues that Wolf timed 
the filing of its cross-claim and third party complaint to derail 
discovery and therefore the third party complaint and portions of 
the cross-claim should be stricken. 
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Wolf argues that its golf course related third party 
complaint and cross claims are timely filed and properly relate 
to the subject matter of this consolidated litigation. 
Specifically, Wolf argues that it viewed its response to the 
Osguthorpes' amended complaint as a pleading being filed in the 
entire consolidated action and therefore the claims are related. 
Wolf claims the Osguthorpe complaint alleged all agreements were 
declared void and that invited this response in the form of these 
cross claims and third party claims. Wolf further argues that 
the deadline for amending pleadings and adding parties under the 
second amended case management order had not yet passed when this 
was filed, and because Wolf discovered the basis for its claims 
against the thi.rd parties in December 2008, it should be allowed 
to proceed with its claims. 
Wolf also argues that it is not attempting to delay 
discovery and is fully cooperating with discovery. 
Finally,.Wolf seeks leave from the court to file its third-
party complaint and cross-claims. 
In response to Wolf's arguments ASCU once again contend that 
Wolf's third party complaint and cross-claims should be stricken 
because of Wolfs failure to comply with Rule 14, URCP, and 
because it is attached to the' incorrect pleading. ASCU further 
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sufficient justification and would result in delay and prejudice. 
More specifically, ASCU contends that Wolf has asserted vaguely 
and without support that it was not until December 2008 that it 
learned of unidentified facts that led it to file its third party 
complaint, which is insufficient justification for its untimely 
motion. ASCU also contends that they, as well as the third party 
defendants, would be substantially prejudiced if Wolf is allowed 
to file its complaint since factual discovery is scheduled to be 
concluded by July 1, 2009. Finally, ASCU urges that Wolf cannot 
show that the other landowners would be legally liable to Wolf if 
Wolf is found in breach of its Ground Lease Agreement with ASCU 
and thus Wolf's claims are legally insufficient. 
As noted GECC and IHC join in .this motion of. ASCU. 
GECC MOTION TO DISMISS. 
GECC, in addition to joining the above motion of ASCU, 
moves to dismiss the claims against it. GECC argues that both 
procedurally and substantively the claims against it must be 
dismissed. 
The only possible basis for Wolf's claim is under the Ground 
Lease, section 16.01. The court should rule as a matter of law 
on that claim that there need not be a contemporaneous exchange 
of equivalent value where only a security interest is granted, as 
that section allows a leasehold mortgage or trust deed, with 
-10-
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notice but permission is not needed, except ONLY where the 
leasehold interest is transferred then there must be an 
equivalent value exchange. 
Because that is so, there can be no tort liability because 
there has been no improper conduct as the Ground Lease allows 
such as was done here. GECC joins in the argument that there is 
no cause of action for contribution and the Utah Liability Reform 
Act does not create a claim for allocation of fault in contract 
matters. 
IHC MOTION TO DISMISS, 
• IHC is in the same basic posture as the Krofcheck third 
party defendants and makes the same arguments in joining the 7\SCU 
motion and also moves to dismiss as does GECC. 
There can be no contribution by bringing in other land 
owners. IHC is not involved in any way with the Ground Lease and 
substantively there can be no valid claim. 
Procedurally, this pleading is again untimely and will 
create prejudice to these third party defendants. 
KROFCHECK JOINDER IN MOTION TO STRIKE AND MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Third party defendants Krofcheck argue that the third party 
complaint is untimely and contrary to the rules of civil 
procedure and should be stricken. Krofcheck'further argues that 
-11-
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permitting the late joinder of the third party defendants would 
be patently unfair and prejudicial since discovery is scheduled 
to conclude on June 30, 2009, within 60 days. Krofcheck further 
argues Wolfs "supplemental notice of joiner [sic] of additional 
defendants'' does not ameliorate Wolf's failure to seek or obtain 
leave to amend. Finally, Krofcheck argues that Wolf's attempted 
joinder cannot be justified as an attempt to allocate fault under 
the Utah Liability Reform Act therefore, ASCU's motion should be 
granted. 
The motion to dismiss by Krofcheck also urges that Wolf 
knew, as shown by its pleadings in October 2007 and its 
depositions of a Wolf principle, Paul Peters, in that same time 
frame, that these third party defendant property owners had not 
transferred their land. Thus, the claim of Wolf that it learned 
of such for the first time in December 2008 is simply wrong. 
Thus, both procedurally and substantively the third party 
complaint against Krofcheck should be dismissed. The basis of all 
three claims against the third party defendants is that the 
Ground Lease -was breached and the SPA Agreement governs these 
issues. Liability cannot be apportioned under contract claims, 
but only, under tort claims. 
In opposition to the third party motions the court on April 
-12-
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13, 2009, allowed a consolidated response. Evidently the parties 
received that on or about April 17, 2009, but it was mistakenly 
not filed with the court until the day of the hearing. Wolf 
argues that it need not obtain leave to amend under Rule 15, 
URCP, as the Osguthorpe First Amended Complaint opened the 
litigation to involve all agreements between all the parties. 
All issues surrounding the golf course are made a part of this 
case. ASCU has alleged in its complaint that Wolf failed to 
convey the golf course land and so Wolf can respond as it has. 
Even if Wolf should have so moved for leave, it has now done so 
and the court should grant that leave. 
Wolf again claims that it was aware the land had not been 
transferred by the third party defendants but was not aware of 
the situation with respect to the escrow of the property. Only in 
December 2008 di'd Wolf, by chance attendance at a meeting, find 
out such facts as justified this third party complaint. . 
If ASCU prevails on its claims as to the golf course, Wolf 
merely wants proper apportionment and these parties need to be 
parties. Wolf agrees it mis-styled the third cause of action as 
one for contribution and it should be for apportionment. 
.There is no prejudice as the discovery surrounding such 
issues is not voluminous nor hard to comprehend. There is no 
trial date and the discovery deadline is an'd must be somewhat 
•flexible given the complexity of the case. 
-13-
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These claims against these third party defendants are viable 
claims and even though Wolf admits it was wrong to label the 
third cause of action for contribution, Wolf is entitled to have 
allocation of fault if .Wolf is proven to be liable to ASCU. 
The Utah Liability Reform Act is broad and allows such 
claims and the statutory enactment may not prohibit a viable 
cause of action. 
DISCUSSION 
Third Party Complaint and motion to amend. 
Here, while Wolf has had over two years to amend its answer 
and/or cross-claims with regards to the golf course issues the 
time to add parties or amend pleadings has not yet passed under 
the case management order.. The case management order, however, 
does not allow an amendment unless the other requirements of law 
are met. The timing of these claims must be explained by Wolf, 
Wolf's effort to do so does not convince the court. Clearly, 
from other pleadings in other cases, Wolf knew the land had not 
been transferred at least by October" 2-007. Thus, the reasons for 
the delay are all against Wolf which has not satisfactorily 
explained the delay. In examining whether there is prejudice, 
the court disagrees completely with Wolf. Despite some comments 
on occasion by counsel in this hearing and elsewhere that the 
case at heart is simple, it has filed 28 volumes of court files 
-14-
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and discovery completion is still two months away. Whatever 
"simple'' means that cannot be it. With numerous depositions 
scheduled in the next two months under the direction of a special 
master, a step back in discovery is prejudicial to all parties 
and to the concept of fairness to all parties. These claims by 
Wolf, whatever their merit, are procedurally flawed in this case 
and the court will not allow the amendment sought by Wolf given 
the delay and the lack of viable explanation for the delay and 
the prejudice to all parties in allowing this late amendment. 
Even though ASCU has known that the golf course has been at issue 
for years, has included the conduct of Wolf relating to the golf 
course in its first amended complaint, and even though Wolf in 
its original answer has discussed the golf course, given the 
posture of the case to allow Wolf to now raise these claims in 
this case is not in the interest of justice. 
Wolf is of course, as noted, free to defend against ASCU's 
claims and assert defenses based on the conduct of others, 
including the putative third party defendants. However, those 
need not be named as defendants as the already unwieldy case, 
long in reaching resolution, would undoubtedly be delayed and 
become more expensive and unmanageable by late-coming parties. 
Thus, procedurally the court DENIES leave for Wolf to file 
this late pleading. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Moreover, Rule 14, URCP, provides that "[a]t anytime after 
commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party 
plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a 
person not a party to the action'who is or may be liable to him 
for all or part of the plaintiff's claims against him." (emphasis 
added). Therefore, in order for Wolf to be able to file its 
third party complaint, the third party defendants must be liable 
to Wolf for all or part of the ASC Parties' claim against Wolf. 
In its third'party complaint, Wolf alleges, in its third 
claim for relief, that if it is found liable for damages to ASCU 
relating to the allegations that Wolf has prevented construction 
of the golf course, every other person or entity that has also, 
prevented construction of the golf course should contribute to 
the damages assessed against Wolf. In Wolf's fifth claim for 
relief it seeks a declaratory judgment ordering third party 
defendants to comply with the SPA Agreement and in its sixth 
claim for relief seeks specific performance to order third party 
defendants to comply with the SPA Agreement. 
The original claims against Wolf, involving the failure to. 
give the land necessary for the golf course to ASCU, stem from 
the Ground Lease Agreement; a contract to which none of third 
party defendants are a party. While Wolf argues that UCA 78B-5-
817 to -823, the Utah Liability Reform Act, allows joinder of 
parties to determine their proportionate share of fault, those 
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statutes apply to torts; and this action is based on contract. 
Wolf relies on the claimed broad definition of fault in 
Field v. Boyezf 952 P.2d 1028 (UT 1998). Whatever Field stood 
for has been somewhat altered in later cases such as Jdzziewski 
v. Smith, 128 P.3d 2005 (UT 2005). To this court those cases 
stand for the proposition that actions in alleged violation of 
contract provisions are not meant to be governed by the Utah 
Liability Reform Act. Those cases discuss whether the act 
applies to intentional torts compared to negligent torts. The 
concept of fault discussed in those cases cannot apply, in this 
court's view, to claimed violations of contract provisions. The 
legal duties imposed by tort law, as exemplified'for example by 
the economic loss rule, are different from the duties imposed by 
contract provisions between parties. The duties owed, and 
remedies available, are different in tort and contract law. 
The court does not believe that Liability Reform Act 
deprives any party of a cause of action. The historical cause of 
action for contribution was also in tort cases, not in contract 
claims. National Serv. Industries v. Nortonr 931 P.2d 551, 554 
(UT. App 1991) . Therefore, in order for the third party 
defendants to be liable to Wolf, Wolf must be able to point to a 
contractual obligation of the third party defendants in order for 
them to owe an independent duty to Wolf. There is certainly 
nothing in the Ground Lease about golf courses or the transfer of 
-17-
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j 
land. 
However, Wolf fails to point to any contractual obligation 
or other source which confers an independent duty upon the third 
party defendant to indemnify or be co-obligated for any damages 
assessed against Wolf. Wolf is, of course, free to defend 
against ASCU's claims on the basis that others interfered with 
Wolf's ability to fully perform if that is shown. Under the Utah 
Liability Reform Act the court concludes that Wolf is not 
entitled to join others who allegedly breached an agreement in 
order to allocate fault. 
While the court need not and does not base its decision on 
this argument, the court agrees with third party defendants that 
the SPA Agreement does require arbitration. Thus, any claim by 
Wolf that the SPA agreement was violated in some way is subject 
to. the mandatory arbitration provision in that agreement. Section 
5.8.1 et.seq. . 
Consequently, because the third party defendants are not 
liable to Wolf allowance of the third party complaint is improper 
under Rule 14, URCP. 
Thus, Wolf's third, fifth and sixth claims for relief are 
stricken. 
-18-
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Cross-Claims and the Claim against GECC 
Rule 13(f), ORCP, provides that M[aJ pleading may state as a 
cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party arising out 
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter 
either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein 
relating to any property that is the subject-matter of the 
original action." While the rule does not specifically provide 
for how cross-claims are to be brought in a case such as this, 
with multiple consolidations, the court believes that allowing 
Wolf to add cross-claims not directly related to the Osguthorpes' 
amended complaint is not in the interest of justice. The court 
finds and concludes that the Osguthorpe First Amended Complaint 
did not "open up" the golf course claims in this case." 
More importantly, under the above procedural analysis this 
. is simply untimely and prejudicial to GECC and there has been no 
satisfactory explanation as to the reason for the delay. 
While the court does not fault Wolf for believing that it 
could bring claims relating to the consolidated cases, it is 
simply not the case that such claims belong in this case at this 
time. The ASCU case, relating to the Ground Lease and the golf 
course, commenced in 2006 and Wolf's answer'has long been filed. 
Therefore, in order for Wolf to be able to file cross-claims not 
relating to the Osguthorpes' amended complaint, which was 
recently amended, Wolf must comply with Rule 15, URCP. 
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Under Rule 15, URCP, after 20 days of the service of a 
pleading the party must seek leave of the court in order to 
amend, In looking at a motion to amend, the court must 
specifically address "(1) the timeliness of the motion;' (2) the 
justification for delay; and (3) any resulting prejudice to the 
responding party/' The Berkshires, L.L.C. v\ Sykes, 2005 UT App 
536, P15. 
Once again, the claims relating to GECC have been known by 
Wolf since 2006. Wolf has not sought leave to amend or bring in 
GECC during those years. Now after discovery has begun Wolf 
seeks to join GECC. While the time to add parties or amend 
pleadings has not passed under the case management order, the 
court finds that there would be considerable prejudice to GECC to 
join them at this late juncture. Approximately seven depositions 
have taken place as well as other discovery over the past two 
years. Furthermore, Wolf's contentions that it just learned of 
new facts in late-December 2008, seems to be aimed towards the 
golf course issues and not the fact that GECC allegedly 
encumbered land with its mortgages. As noted, factually that 
proposition asserted by Wolf is found to be incorrect in any 
event. 
Considering the motions the court has already heard in 
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regards to the mortgages, the court finds it unpersuasive that 
Wolf could not have joined GECC at an earlier point in time. 
Therefore, because of the untimely filing and because of the 
substantial prejudice that would result to GECC, Wolf's fourth 
claim for relief is stricken. 
In addition, while the court has issued other opinions in 
the past, the court believes it now more fully understands the 
Ground Lease and its meaning. The court believes, though it is 
not finally ruling, that Section 16.01 of the Ground Lease does 
in fact allow such-leasehold mortgages and trust deeds as a , 
security interest, without permission from Wolf. ONLY, and 
SOLELY if there is a transfer of such a leasehold interest, does 
there need to be a contemporaneous exchange of equivalent value. 
Thus, if the court were not striking the pleading of Wolf, and if 
the court were forced to reach the merits of the motion of GECC 
to dismiss, the court would likely rule that the GECC conduct is 
•not and could not be the basis of liability under Section 16.01 
as it now appears to the court that this was NOT a transfer of 
ASCU's leasehold interest but the creation of a security interest 
in GECC. 
Again, the court is NOT finally ruling on that question but 
is' advising the parties of its"current belief as to the nature 
l^'!y;l![^'':if?Eil??^ 
-21-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and meaning of that Ground Lease provision. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ASCU's motion to strike 
is GRANTED. 
Wolf's motion to amend is DENIED. 
< GECC's motion to strike is GRANTED. 
The motions of the third party defendants, Krofcheck and IHC 
is GRANTED. 
The court does not reach the merits of the motions of GECC 
or IHC or Krofcheck to dismiss because it has ruled the pleading 
by Wolf is to be stricken. 
This Ruling and Order is.the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED t h i s n day of f y l f) j , 2009, 
BY THE 
/BRUCE K:. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
-22-
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AMENDED AND RESTATED VEVELOFMENT AGREEMENT 
FOR THE CANYONS SPECIALLY PLANNED AREA 
SNYDERVELLE BASIN, SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH 
WIS AMENDED AND RESTATED DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT (the 
"Amended Agreement") is entered into as of this ffi" day of .KfavtoftW > 1999, by and 
among ASC Utah, inc,< d.h.a, The Canyons, American Skiing Company Resort Properties, 
inc. (collectively the "Master Developer".)* the group of landowners thai are listed as 
Participating Owners and are signatories hereto (collectively the "Participating 
Landowners"), and Summit County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, by and 
through ib Board of County Commissioners ("the County'*'). 
' • " • • ' • RECITALS . 
A. Master Developer and Panicipaiing; Landowners (collectively the 
"Developers") are the owners, legal representatives; of the owners, or lessees, under long* 
term leases of approximately 7768 acres of land and appurtenant real property rights located 
in Summit County, Utah, the legal description and ownership maps of which are provided ID 
Ordinance 333-A (the •"Property"). 
B On July 6. 1998, the County adopted and approved Ordinance 333, which 
established an initial Specially Planned Area f^SFA*') Zone District for a portion of the 
-property. The initial SPA Plan for The Canyons SPA Zone District was Implemented by 
Ordinance 334, a Development Agreement, among the County and various of die Developers 
(the "Original Development Agreement*). . . 
C The Original Development Agreement contemplated the need to amend the 
SPA Zone District and SPA Plan in the future to provide for its expansion and to create a 
master planned reson community as depicted in The Canyons SPA Plan Book of Exhibits 
attached hereto and incorporated herein, 
D. The County and the Developers desire to amend and restate (tie Original 
Development Agreement to provide for the vesting of certain additional land use 
designation*;, densities, development configurations, yrul development standards included in 
The Canyon,'} SPA Master Development Plan, as reflected on Exhibit B hereto. 
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO; 
Summit County Clerk 
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Original Deyeloptnciu Agreement, the -Count)' has encouraged the Master Developer to 
employ Iruipvaiive land planning concepts within The Canyon* SPA Plan an order to cluster 
and appropriately I0c9.ce development density, preserve sensitive bunds, create significant 
private and public recreational amenities, open spaces, and trails, and provide principally a 
nux of destination accommodations, commercial uses, and other resort, support housing, 
futilities* amenities, and programs that will be carried out Within Tlie Canyons SPA Plan and 
within Summit Count)1 in furtherance of the goals of tlie General Plan. 
13. A Statement of Global Principles, which Is attached liereto as Exhibit A, 1, 
was applied to The Canyons SPA Plan 10 guide planning and development. The Global 
Principles established certain requirements and standards in -addition 10 the standards 
delineated in tlie Code and die General Plan, Tlie Global Principle* are implemented through 
the regulation and monitoring of subsequent Development Approvals.(as defined below) 
pursuant. .10 the terms of this Amended Agreement, and as incorporated herein shall apply, 
according to their terms, to all Development Approvals within The Canyons SPA Flan. The 
Global Principles and bow each is satisfied by this Amended Agreement are m forth below, 
A, Comfortable Carrying Capacity in the Ski Area. The on-mountain comfortable 
carrying capacity shall exceed the bedbase at any given time, 
I I Allowable Density in The Canyons SPA. The total.density within The Canyons 
SPA ta te into account comfortable carrying capacity; design guidelines that comply 
with the 'policies of the General Plan and the Code; the Global Principles; die 
mitigation of on- and off-site impacts; and a substantial level of economic and tax base 
benefits that will accrue to die County. 
G> Required Unit Configurations and Occupancy for all Development in The 
.•Canyons Resort Community ID Maximize Resort,'Guest Accommodation and Minimize 
'private "Residences, This principle h met through the limitation requiring that no less 
than 80% of all beds in the Resort Center are alkcaicd to resort and guest 
accommodations, and within ,the Reson Core, no less ton 90% of the beds are . 
allocated to resort and guest: .accommodations. . 
D, Development Phasing, This Amended Agn^meai balances the development of 
resort accommodations with the comfortable carrying capacity of the Resort by 
rewiring that development generally begin in (he Report Core and move outward, 
•E, Provisional Open Space. In the original SPA Ordinance, as a condition of 
receiving the Phase I approvals, all remaining lands owned or controlled by several x>F 
the Developers were classified as Provisional Open Space and restricted from 
development until die balance of the -property received master plan approval. This 
Amended Agreement establishes classes of open space which serve to ensure me 
adequate protection and long term viability of open .space 'Within The Canyons SPA 
Zone District. 
4 
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. F, Development Pattern, Tilts Amended Agreement dusters development and 
nt&Kimize? open space, . 
G. Resort Support and Mountain Recreation Development, This Amended 
Agreement defines guidelines for on-mountain development, which includes some on-
. mountain guest accommodation white limiting such accommodations to a unique rustic 
mountain character designed in harmony with the natural landscape, 
I I Provision of On-Mountain Ameimieb. Uniquely designed resort amenities and 
accommodations will be allowed at mid-moimimn, 
i, Viewshed. This Amended Agreement establishes pmccdures for the protection 
of yiwsbcds. 
J Viewshed Criteria, This Amended Agreement implements ^risual quality 
objectives consistent with the Genera) PJan through defined viewshed protection 
requirements as part of the design criteria in the Viewshed and Visual Quality Analysis 
and Plan attached hereto as Exhibit II. 1. 
K. Environmental Enhancement, Conservation, and Preservation.. This Amended 
Agreemeni enhances die environment, conservauptt, and preservation through a Natural 
Resource Management Flan and a Watershed Master Plan for the Willow .Draw Area, 
and through the incorporation of "green* design principles including energy efficiency 
and building techniques. The Amended Agreement further complies with this Global 
Principle through the implementation of the recommendation*; in die Natural Resources .. 
Maniigemem Plan and the.Watershed Management Plan. 
L Employee Housing, Employee housing will be provided lor a substantia]' 
number of resort employees in the Resort Center consistent with The Canyons 
Employee Housing Heeds Assessment and Proposed Mitigation Plan. The balance* of 
identified employee housing needs will be provided elsewhere in die SnydervIHe 
Basin/Park City area, • • 
H, Economic Base, This Amended Agreement will result m substantia! positive tax 
bene tits to the County and others. 
.' N, Transportation. This Amended Agreement provides for the implementation of a 
comprehensive transportation plan, which includes the following components: fi) 
cooperation in die creation of a regional transportation system; (ij) linkages to the Salt 
Lake City area, including the airport, via various; forms of transit for employees and 
guests; (hi) an internal transportation system within The Rcsan and Resort Community 
including valet service, shuttle buses, and a people mover; (iv) a comprehensive 
pedestrian trail system; and (vj incentives to encourage the implementation of litis 
policy. 
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0 Highway 224 and Resort Entry, A significant open space buffer will be created 
along Highway 224 to establish a "green" setting, including portions of a golf course 
and ike Millennium Trail and a special study for Highway 224 landscape 
eitaieements, 
P. Benchmark Assessments of Resort Development, Impacts, and .Programs, This 
Amended Agreement provides detailed mechanisms for linking phased growth with 
mitigation measures, and for evaluating these .'beiiclxmarks, ensuring thatpolicies of 
concurrency are met 
Q. Development Design Criteria, This Amended Agreement provides architectural 
guidelines to assure unique architectural character and the highest standards of design 
quality and construction. The guidelines Will be enforced in pari by The Canyons 
Resort Village Management Association (the "RVMA"') and The Colony Master 
Association.. 
R. Master Community and Resort 'Facility, Amenity, Recreation, Cultural Arts, 
and Marketing Program. This Amended Agreement provides for a recreation master 
plan to be developed, resort amenities to be provided, a public art implementation and 
management program to be instituted, and continuing cooperation with the County, the 
Special Recreation District and the Park City/Summit County Arts Council. A resort-
wide .marketing program will be administered and paid for through The Canyons 
Resort; Village Management Association, 
•S. Community integration, This Amended Agreement provides for the 
establishment of s "good neighbor™ policy to provide accessibility to the .resort 
.amenities by the commtmiry. A community integration plan is being developed which 
. establishes appropriate buffers between lite Reson Community and existing residential 
. neMiborhoods :bui also defines .linlages through appropriate trail connections and other 
• . means. 
:T, Infrastructure Maintenance and Management Tbts Amended Agreement 
provides for lite maintenance of two master associations, one for The Colony and one 
for the balance of The Canyons SPA.. Each .toaster association will provide for the 
maintenance and management of all infrastructure owned-and controlled by that master 
association. All areas of mutual interest shall be maintained and managed through a 
Joint Operating Agreement between the Master Associations, 
V, Construction Mitigation and Management. This Amended Agreement provides 
for mitigation and management measures to be in effect for each phase of development 
to assure compliance with the Code, in accordance with .Exhibit F hereto. 
14. The Global Principles, in addition to other requirements* contain a set of 
conceptual "Benchmarks", intended to provide quantitative and .qualitative measurement of 
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Exhibit 11.3, shall be initialed by die RVMA within ISO days'add shall be completed 
by the KVMA within 24 months of the Effective pale of Um Amended Agreement in 
conjunction with, the golf course, This requirement sba.ll' include enhancement and 
.maintenance on both the east and west sides of Highway 224 in a meaningful way 
which promotes a quality entry to ihe Resort. "Xliis schedule will require thai golf 
holes H, 12, and 13 be programmed for early construction so as lo allow for final 
landscape in this period. A final plan for the entry corridor shall be .submitted to the 
County within 30 days of completing the preliminary dcsi.cn and engineering for the 
related portions of the golf course. Said plan shall comply with the standards set forth 
in the SR 224 Corridor Plan completed by Design Workshop for Summit County and 
.shal I require Low Impact Permit approval 
•3.2,6 Golf Course;, The Canyons Master Plan includes an environmentally sensitive 
IB-hole golf course, as depicted in Exhibit HA so as to satisfy the County's 
requirement thar The Canyons be a world class, all Reason resort. The parties to this 
Amended Agreement whose property includes land for the proposed golf course 
acknowledge and agree that completion of the course is one of the highest priority 
public amenities in the SPA. To (his end, all affected property owners hereby agree 
to establish an agreement within 90 days of the Effective Date of this Amended 
Agreement for die purpose of setting such lands aside ai no cost to the. County, 
RVMA, or other entity for the construction of the golf course. Tlie Developers shall 
permit tlie golf course developer to construct the amenity without obstruction or 
•interference. Prior to start of construction of the golf course, the affected property 
required for completing the golf course, including adequate buffer areas, shall be 
conveyed at no cost to the. RVMA, Further, die RVMA and the Master Developer 
•will ensure that the course is completed within 36 months of the effective date of this; 
Amended Agreement, starting as early as possible in die Spring of 20(10. In the event 
that tlie Master Developer does in fact exercise and commit the funds lo ensure 
delivery of tlie golf course as indicated herein, ten tlie Master Developer shall have 
tlie option of tailing ownership of ilie golf course in its entirety. The golf course 
$e<tten shall, to the extant feasible based on the.planned tearleci. maximize the 
preservation of natural features especially in viewshed areas., This will be 
accomplished through the. use of a "target course design" In iht most environmentally 
sensitive areas. Outside of such areas design flexibility shall be permitted, in 
addition, the stream corridor in Willow Draw will be reclaimed by desiguiug a more 
natural stream channel that removes tlie stream from culvert* und creates appropriate 
water features, und pedestrian trails and benches along tlie stream through creative 
grading arid as pan of the plan. While priority may be given to residents and guests 
of properties within die boundaries of the RVMA and to a Developer participating in 
financing the course when approved by separate agreement with the RVMA, tee 
tunes, subject to ail standard rules, regulations, and feci; established for KVMA 
properties, shall be made available to the general public The golf course shall 
require a Low Impact Permit approval. 
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program, Together they are the basic levei of facilities that shall be 
•planned to be built over ihe period required lo complete construction of 
the resort* the exhibits include a schedule for completion of the facilities, 
The RVMA and The Resort Developer may provide additional amenities 
•as they determine appropriate. The responsibility 2nd authority for this 
work is vested in the RVMA, The Resort, and. to ihe extent agreed 
upon in the Resort Village Management Association Agreement, other 
Project Site developers. Hie amenities and suited priorities of 
construction will be diligently pursued by the RVMA, The Resort, and 
relevant Project Site Developers. Tlie first priority of the RVMA is the 
design and construction, of tlie golf course. With regard to its 
. obligations, the RVMA shall establish and maintain a five year capital 
improvement program and an annual capital budget for the purpose of 
scheduling, budgeting for/ financing,, and undertaking these amenities. 
The RVMA Amenity Plan, which will be reviewed with the Count)' 
during the annual review, may vary somewhat based on ihe availability 
of revenues to and the ability to finance the amenities by the RVMA. 
With respect to tlie Resort's amenity plan, ASC Utah may amend the 
implementation schedule for its amenities plan annually to account for 
plan changes and adjustments. To alter tlie improvements included in 
ASC Utah's amenity plan, County approval shall be required. In. cases 
•where alternative funding, sources may be available, the potential for use 
of those sources will be fully explored' th .order to achieve the priorities 
indicated, 
(2) Exhibit 1.2 identifies the trail system for The Resort and the 
. Resort Community. Easements -or othej conveyance for major regional 
trail segments will be given to the Snydervilb Basin Special Recreation 
District. Conveyances, easements and construe*ion standards and 
responsibilities shall be as described in Exhibit 1,2,3. 
<3) "Hie RVMA shall prepare a Rcsart Competitiveness .Analysis at 
least even* five years to assess the position of The Resort arid Resort 
Community versus other global businesses viewed as competitors. Such 
analysis will be undertaken with two markets in mind ~ short-term 
visitors to The Resort and resort property purchasers. The purpose of 
the analysis is to identify trends in die industry and anticipate and 
implement, when appropriatet programs, amenities and facilities, 
marketing strategies, real estate offerings, and olhur measures to 
capitalize on such trends and attraei and retain customers. The RVMA 
will include the analysis in die Annual Review in these years that the 
analysis is undertaken, 
{4) The Master Developer, the RVMA. and Director shall continue 
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5.5.1 Any default, or inability to care a default caused by strikes; lockouts, labor 
disputes, acts of God,, inability 10 obtain labor or materials' or reasonable- substitutes 
therefor, enemy or hostile governmental action, civil coiunioii.au* fire or other 
casualty, and other similar causes beyond die reasonable control of the parry obligated 
to perform, shall excuse the performance by such party far u period equal to the. period 
during which any such event prevented, delayed or stopped my required performance 
or effort to cure a default, 
5.5.2 In die event the real estate sales figures published by the Park City Board of 
Realtors show -a 20% or greater decline for real estate sales in the Park City area for 
the comparable six-month period in the preceding year or If the number of beds rented 
published by the Park City Chamber of Conimefce/Conventum and Visitors Bureau for 
die Park City area shows a 1.0% or greater decline hi lite number of beds rented for the 
comparable six-month period of the preceding year, then the R.VMA and /or The 
Colony Master Association may notify the Community DevelopmeM Director of such 
downturn m the economy and request u six-month extension of all the time limits set 
forth herein, Upon die verification of .such published figures, bin in no event later than 
twenty (20) days after such request:, the Director shall grant a six-month extension on 
all relevant dates of performance as .set forth herein. The Director shall thereafter 
immediately provide notice of such extension to die Planning Commission and BCC. 
IJI die event such downturn continues, the Director may grain additional she month 
extensions for the duration of the downturn. The RVMA may request and receive .up 
to a maximum of twenty-four (24) months of such extensions during the first fifteen 
.(15) years of the term of this Amended Agreement, 
Section 5,6 Con*inu i rig Obligations. Adoption of law or other governmental activity making 
.performance by the Developers unprofitable, more difficult or more expensive does not 
excuse the performance of the obligations by the Developers, 
Section 5,7 Other Remedies. All other remedies at law or hi equity« which are consistent 
wilii die provisions of this Amended Agreement are .available to the patties to pursue in the 
event there is a breach. 
Section 5*8 Dispute Resolution. 
5.KJ Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism contained herein 
shall not sufficiently resolve, a dispute under this Amended Agreement, then every such 
continuing dispute, difference, and disagreement shall be referred to a single arbitrator 
agreed upon by the parties* or if no single arbitrator can be agreed upon, an arbitrator 
or arbitrators shall be selected in. accordance with the rules of lite .American Arbitration 
Association and such dispute, difference, or disagreement shall be. resolved by die 
binding decision of the arbitrator, and judgment upon die award rendered by the 
.arbitrator may be entered in. any court having jurisdiction-thereof. .However, in no 
instance shall rids arbitration provision prohibit the Count)' from exercising 
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enforcement of its police powers where Developers are in direct violation of die Code. 
5 JL2 Institution of Legal Action. Enforcement of any such arbitration decision shall 
be Irxsiitutcd in the Third Judicial District Cairn nf the County of Summit, State of 
Utah, or in the United States District Court, for Utah. 
5.S3 Rights of Third Parties. This Amended Agreement is not intended to affect or 
create any additional rights or obligations .on the part of third panics. 
5.8.4 Third Party .Legal Challenges. In those instances where, in oris Amended 
Agreement, Developers have agreed to waive a position with respect to die 
applicability of current Count}' policies and requirements, or where Developers have 
agreed to comply with current Count)' policies and requirements, Developers further 
agree not to participate either directly or indirectly in any legal challenges to such 
County policies and requirements by third panics, including but no? limited to 
appearing as a witness, amicus, making a Financial contribution thereto, or otherwise 
assisting in the prosecution of the action. 
5.8.5 Enforced Delay. Extension of Times of Performance, hi addition to specific 
provisions of diis Amended Agreement, performance by die County, lite Master 
Developer, or a Participating Landowner hereunder shall not be deemed to be in 
default where delays or .defaults are due to war, insurrection, strikes, walkouts, riots, 
floods, earthquakes, ores, casualties, or acts of God. An extension of time for such 
cause shall be granted in writing by County for the period of the enforced delay or 
longer, as may be mutually agreed upon. 
5,8*6 Attorney's Fees. Should any party hereto employ an attorney for the purpose 
of enforcing this Amended Agreement, or any judgment based on this Amended 
Agreement, or for any reasons or in tmy legal proceeding whatsoever, including 
insolvency, bankruptcy, arbitration, declaratory relief or other litigation, including 
appeals or re-hearings, and whether or noi an action has actually commenced, the. 
prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the other party thereto rcimbuTsems.ni 
for ail attorney's fees and all costs and expenses, Should any judgment or final order 
be issued in that proceeding, said reimbursement shall he specified therein. 
$<&,7 Venue. Venue for all legal proceedings related to this Amended Agreement 
shall be in the District Court for die County of Summit, in Coalville, Utah. 
5.8*8 Damages upon Termination. Except with respect to jusi compensation and 
attorneys' fees under mis Amended Agreement. Developers shall noi be entitled to any 
damages against the County upon the unlawful termination of this Amended 
Agreement. 
Section 5.9 Term of Agreement and Automatic Renewal. 
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Ik exercise of its governmental functions. The Project is not a joint venture, and there, is no 
such relationship involving ihc County Nothing in this Amended Agreement shall preclude . 
rite Master Developer and any Panicipatirig Landowner from forming any form of investment 
entity for the purpose of compleuriE any ponton of the Project, 
Section 6.2 Construction of Agreement. This- .Amended Agreement shall be construed so as . 
10 effectuate the public purpose of resolving disputes, implemenuag Jung-range planning 
objectives, obtaining public benefits; and protecting any compelling, countervailing public 
interest; while providing reasonable assurances of continued vested development rights under 
litis Amended Agreement. 
Section 6,3 Covenant "Running with Land. This Amended Agreement shall be recorded 
against all legal parcels of record within the Property described in Summit Conwy Ordinance 
333-A* All the terms and conditions contained herein shall be deemed to "run with the 
land" and shall be binding on and shall inure to the benefit of all successors in ownership of 
parcels within (he Properly, As used herein, .Developers' shall include die parties signing ibis 
Amended Agreement and identified as "Developers," and all successor owners of any parcel 
of laud within the Property. 
Section 6.4 .Notices. All notices hereunder shall be given in writing by certified mail, 
postage prepaidk at the following addresses: 
To the County: 
The Board of County Commissioners of Summit County 
Sunim.it County Courthouse 
'P.O.Box 128 
•Coalvilte, Utah g40I7 
Summit County Director of Community Development 
P.O. Box 128* 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
With copies to: 
David L. Thomas' 
.Deputy Summit County Attorney 
P.O. Box 128 8*01297 Po00469 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
To the Master Developer; 
Greg Spearn 
Senior Vice President 
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The Canyons 
4000 The. Canyons Resort Drive 
•pArir City. Utah 84098 
Juiiannc C\ Ray 
Vice President and Assistant General Counsel 
American Siding Company Resort Properties* Inc. 
One Monument Way 
•Portland, Maine 04101 
With copies to: 
Clark Thompson, Esq. 
Bracewell and Patterson 
711 Louisiana, Suite 2900 
Houston, I X 77GQ2-27S1. 
To the Participating landowners: 
At the addresses set forth in Ordinance 333-A. 
Or i,o such other addresses or to the attention of such other person as either party or their 
successors may designate by written notice. 
Section 6,5 Recordation of Agreement. The Count)' Clerk of Summit County shall, within 
ten (10) days after the Effective Date of the ordinance adopting this Amended Agreement, 
record this Amended .Agreement. 
.Section 6.6 Severability, 'If any provision of this .Amended Agreement* or the application 
of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, mid, or unenforceable, but 
(he remainder of litis Amended Agreement can be enforced without failure of material 
consideration IO any party, then the remainder of tins Amended Agreement shall not be 
affected thereby and it shall remain in full force and effect, unless amended or modified by 
•mutual consent of the parties. If any material provision of this Amended Agreement is held 
invalid, void, or unenforceable or if consideration is removed or destroyed, the Master 
Developer or the County shall have the right in their sole and absolute discretion to terminate 
this Amended Agreement by providing written notice of such termination to the other part}'. 
Section 6.7 Indemnification and Hold Harmless. 
6.7 J. Agreement of Developers. Developers agree to indemnify and hold harmless 
the County, its officers,, agents, employees, consul hints, attorneys, special counsel ainf 
representatives from liability: 
O O S 5 3 9 1 1 BK01297 PGD0470 
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not contained herein. 
Suction (115 Execution of Agreement. This Amended Agreement may be executed in 
iimkiple. parts or originals or by facsimile, copies of executed originate; provided, however, if 
executed and evidence of execution is made by facsimile copy, then an original shall be 
provided 10 die oiher pany within seven (7j days of receipt of said facsimile copy. 
Section 6 16 Relationship of Parties. The contractual relationship between the County and 
trie Master Developer and Participating Landowners arising out of this Amended Agreement 
us one of independent contractor and not agency, This Amended Agreement does not create 
any third party beneficiary rights. It is specifically understood by the par ties that: (a) The 
Canyons SPA Plan is a private development; (b) County has no interest In, responsibilities 
for. or duty to third parties concerning any public improvements to the Property unless the 
County accepts the public improvements pursuant to the provisions of ibis Amended 
Agreement or in connection with subdivision or condominium plat or site plan approval; and 
(c) Developers shall have the full power and exclusive control of the Property subject to the 
obligations of the Developers set forth in this Amended Agreement. 
Section 6.17 Applicable Law. This Amended Agreement is entered into under and pursuant 
to, and is to be construed and enforceable in accordance with, the laws of die State oflJiah. 
Section 6.18 I./ical Laws and Standards. Where this Amended Agreement refers to "local 
laws and standards" it means the laws and standards of general applicability to The Canyons 
SI*A Plan and all other developed and subdivided properties wiihin the Snydervflle Basin of 
Summit County. 
Section 6,19 State and Federal Law, The parties agree, intend and understand that Ore 
obligations imposed by this Amended Agreement are only such as are consistent with slate 
and federal law, The parties further agree that if any provision of this Amended Agreement 
becomes, in its performance:, inconsistent tvith state or federal law or ts declared invalid, this 
Amended' Agreement shall be deemed amended to the extent necessary to make it consistent 
with state or federal law, as the case ma}' be, and die balance of this Amended Agreement 
shall remain in full force and effect. 
Section 6.20 Exhibits Incorporated. All Exhibits in die Book of Exhibits arc incorporated by 
reference herein as if full}' set forth herein. 
Section 6.21 School and Institutional Trust Lands. Notwithstanding any other provision of 
tliis Agreement to the contrary, ail obligations imposed under this Agreement as they may 
relate to die State of Utah acting by and through the School and institutional Trust Lands 
Administration or its successor agencies, shall be satisfied by the Master Developer, and all 
parties to this Agreement agree to look solely to the Master Develops! in any action to 
enforce this Agreement with respect to lands owned by the State of Utah. Nothing in this 
Agreement or the exhibits thereto shall be deemed to waive the sovereign immunity of the 
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Stale, of Utah except through compliance with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act; to 
permit the Imposition o; enforcement of any lien or assessment as against state lands; or to 
waive the provisions of Utah Cods Ann. § 17-27*104.5 or any successor statute; provided, 
however, that the State of Utah, by execution of this Agreement,, agrees to grant conservation 
elements direct)}' in the manner required by paragraph 1&2.2.1 of this Agreement for the 
benefit of the County, and to adhere to the density allocation foi State, property provided by 
this Agreement and the Canyons SPA Plan. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this .Amended Agreement has been executed by Summit 
County, acting by md through the Board of County Commissioners of Summit County, State 
of Utah, pursuant to Ordinance Bffi-K , authorizing such execution, and by a duly authorized 
representative of Developers, as of the above stated date. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 
OUNTY, STATE OF UTAJ* 
Sheldon D, Richins, Chairman 
STATE OP UTAH 
COUNTV OF SUMMIT 
; ss. 
The foregoing instrument as acknowledged before me this I<T clay of 7 l*^.**Jui i* , 
1999. by Sheldon D. Richins, Chairman of \ht Board of Count}7 Commissioners of Summit 
County, State of Utah. 
. . I lQk^^ ,\. fe/SJ^Lfei 
Notary Public 
s&*=±l 
My commission expires: 
'^'ISPv Notary Public j 
"" N % HAfiSKA S. CIIITTeWDEN t 
j \ eoftafff>w*.iS!. P.0 Boast i 
1— « ^ £ J C « mm mtm^mJmmmtJmm mi 
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ASC l^AH, INC, d.lvi. WECANYONS 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT 
,rfe 
Tlw forgsuwnc. teirumeni was adznojvlcdspd before meJlsis j jL .. 1999. bv 
£*p?^^ .-^3- SPfcWCEH G SANDSES 
Malory PMoflc 
Ivlv conunis^ion. &io . expires: AJov, /*-/ &*f&°\ 
k I K * ^ * ^ ° « gv w gjwft 
AMERICAN SKIING COMPANY RESORT 
PROPERTIES, IMC 
...By: &3£.tiS&v£ & - &*-r*.f**ff&f T* 
ST ATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY .OFSUMMIT 
:s%. 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged bi d w w t U i s i S ^ 1999. by 
^ffefiiry Public . . / O 4 
My commission expires: 
SPQiCER G SAKD33 I 
Notary Pubte I 
, Swop*; C* Part: Cllv tn 5<o?a F 
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STATE OP L45 
BeavcrCrcck Associates 
10aAJikjA nrr SctrcAw ,^ 
Q*. : ss. 
COUNTY OF ^ M M I f j 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before rnc liws / day of 
f / * T O 
~-«» »•».« — "•'' ^^" ^»« ( .^p i .mrMR' sag/aastf m< 
MY Commission Expires; Y Co ission hxpir 
Notary Ptfbljc 





The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before vac ihi$ ,r. „..„ day of ^  
i 999, by . ' • ' - . " 
Notary Public 
Residing ai:^,. 
My Commission Expires: 
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Wolf Mountain Resarts, LC 
By 
Its: 
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D A Osgutliorpc Family Pannerafaip 
w& 
STATE OF i ^ T T ^ 
COUNTY OF ftra/UAM 
. 7 , <? 
The fbreeoms instrument was acknowledged before me thus 7J_ dav of PjVg^gg?f—-" 
— - ^ <r - / / ^ / ) / 
,fta&cK*5> i 
My Coinitiissitin Expires: 
CJ • * " — t — 5 * r ~ Notary P^b)/jc 
Residing at: irUj^^J. f C ^ * * ^ 
STATE OF. 




The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this day of_ 
1999. bv . 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
My Cdrmnlsuion Expires: 
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Wi I'll am Lincoln Spear 
LcsiccShcrrili Spoor 
lis: 
STATE OF ) 
COUNTY OF ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this day of. 
1999, by" . 
Notary Public 
Residing at:, 
My Commission Expires: 
]mn iVioumam Associates, LLC 
. By: _ _ 
l\s> 
STATE Of ) 
' 5S. 
COUNTY OF „ ) 




My Commission Expires: 
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The foregoing instrument was acknowledged btiorz mc this tfay of _ 
1999. by „__ 
My Commission Expires:. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
STATE OF U.TA3f 
Qlympus Construction LLC 
OsSiz - ©5puiai»c Parcel} 
By-
<r CDQNTY OF r7^1 ftApi \ T ~ ) 
The fbregoma instrument was acknowledged befbie me this £> day of /J& eKQjS^ 
1999, by S^CrjTxJ^^U . 
4Pffi&IEAPEBEZ , 
r.&,fttt*9B0 f 
^^ I—7^ Y y 
Horary FuWic ( / Kotfury Public 
Residing at:.. 
My Commission Expires; 
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The Canyons Cabin Club, LLC 
(Baker Parcel) 
• OF VcFku 
L^ 
COUNTY OF J ^ M N - U T ^ \ 
The foregoing instromcai was acknowledged before me dug ^ day of .NcTVfivqgg^ 
_ _ ^ A / * /r'l? 
p.o.BWKBwo * Notary^PuDln; ^ 
L S ^ - . - . ^ , ^ ^ ^ S - - J Residing at: CH^MfrMj 
iVH' Commission Expires: 
«' I (Wy 





The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me chis^ . 
1999, by ; . 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
M\ C »Tiirii^ ii""»r. F\pi-=^ 
0 0 5 5 3 9 1 1 &if-::,r7 &G00*£1 
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S S M ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ V 
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.Halbel Engineering, Inc. 
By: 
ST A t'E Of., 
;. ss.. 
COUNTY OF 
The foregoing instnimeni was acknowledged before m.e this dzy of^  
1999. bv~ .. . _ , ~ 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public 
. Rcsiditie at: 
STATE OF, Irfkd 
Harold R. & Kjith B, Weight ^ ^ — -
nv *#A/ X/r ^ ) / / 
f / ^ « j 4 f - ;
 7' \ 
• -" f "' *' £ * if * ' i" 
COUNTY OF SfAM-PUf i 
The foftgaasg iastnimeaip'as adjaowtetiged before me_thts (? day of N f f J ^ W P ' ' 
, ,




•* JSS&I®~J /, ^  Residing at: QLiUt^iT" jk)\f^n 
rp
 f—,, _ _ 
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APPROVED AS TO FOR&I: 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTjpftKgY OeNcftUL^ 
State ofUiah School &• Institutional Trust: 
Lands 
By: l I L 
1(5
 P^^sT <P/g 
SI"ATE OF. „, LkitxA :.., 
COUNTY OF^L/t.^AA^ i 




 0~~ : ~ " 
Notary Public 
ResidinE at: $(->£-, aJT 
/ : , v . ^ x DAWNYEILGALJJEN 
/v«^su^^ Mm paw, $urt «/ inm 
€78 EAST 600 SOUTH *500 
*ALTlAKE5rTY.VrA>< M 1 « 
C O M M . E X R M S - 0 2 
.My Commission Expires: 
UT??^ 
s. 
Mines Ventures:9/f0fcCompany, Inc 
-"—~ ; y 
S T A I E OF. 
COUNTY OF C&fis^f~tj 
l i l t fpregpufig insiiumeai wz$ acknowledged before me this J^_ day of ?%&\f&Mgg?< 
vm< bv P&g&Lr C • CVUM/A J/?? ^ 




1 » 1 1 
/ -w i~- ^4n *-"~L7 
" T ^ j 1 f>r ^ r u J ," 
#5 Urf-
*G >>» 
* M <-* 
s£4J 
& * i 
& & 
H r 
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Notary P u S * * * T . .. , . _ 
SAS&A KARB DATBR $ C & M Properties, LLC 
Pes: ca».l**h MOSS
 t ^S^ - . > -^^  / ' 
STATE OF (jTCbK-. i 
>* T .1 
H A 
lis: /Vf^/<?jt>?$^ 
COUNTY OF ^ O u ^ ^ t i 
The Inreyqinginstrumentwas.acknow]edged bctoreme this /.£.. day of Moi//9m ban , 
'Notary Public v— " Nota
_ ... , 9... Z-./7 
M y Comm m io nj} Kpires: 
Silver Kirm Mines 
- " / , 
STATE Or frlT^ 
5 : $$.-, _ u^rv^-r ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
 t & J day at* JJffi• C?^j^P ' wi**-
.Mens, i b^^s^*=^Ji2^r 
l^v Conimission Expires; 
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Parkway land Development, LC 
By: ^ 
Its: 
STATE 0 ? . 
COUNTY OF. 
The foregoing instrument was admowledged before me this day of\. 
1999, by . 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE Of. HTMt 
COUNTY OF cTin YM^LAA \ 
to«€—jay*-***. r ^ / \ ^ ^ ^ v , 
si;.. 
The foregoing lustrum. 
, P.O. Bo? 3206 * 
J'ateCty.Ua*! ©4080.233? ft 
2 ? £ C _ ^SWfiiUWap^ J . 
Mv Commission Expires: 
em was acknowledged before mr this J . day of Ul)]J$tf$Eff*-
Notary P&4& & 
Residue at; £ T »u-*i~cf Ck*M? y 
Q O J J ? . U BK0I297 P600485 
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STATE OF UTAH: ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
The Foregoing instrument: was acknowledged before me this / day of November, 
199% by "tibtiM^r&ll&fd '"! , 
Mmwm. ! 3^f^%^^^ - d ^ 
i W E ® "SgiSSKST i Notary Pibk <J~ 
Residing at: ^ v VIA IUM ' j - ^QtW-''H -S«i«yBL»J 
My Commission Expires: 
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t-m~W-lS9B 14:22 Tha Canyons> RE Drue lop. 425 615 AB5S P,02/02 
IHC Hospitals, b e , «lw»/ IHC Hec^tt^ Services 
STATE OF J&jeJ,,*' 
COUNTY oN*M3&^~ ) 
T
 n 












The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this, 




My Commission Expires: 
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STATE OF yif<fn^L(X^ > 
COUNTY OF X^d-JritL^ \ 
The forfigoir^iittttunicQi was acknowledged before me this ./# ^~day ofA^^&^C 
1999, by c / V . Prfi/vAttlL ~ * ' 
-Hoik 
My Commission Expires: //j/'/J^v^'/ 
7 # . /&^y g^f 'X 
^Public V'/^H ."^ 
Residing at: A^CtM/%^%^^i^rt / Ip A. | 
O O 5 S 3 9 1 1 fc(cO 12.97 PGOOVB3 
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CALIFORNIA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
LOS ANGELES ' ' 
COUNTY OF«SUMMIT ) 
GERALD KRPDMAN 
By: /_ 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before melius Kkh day of November, 
1999, by Gerald M. Friedman . 
'^TS^L Commission# 1225595 | V iv . ,« , .tj.iWiL 
zlh*!Sgm ^ «..wi^  ^«III u. 5 Notary Public t ^ S ^ ^ tfsiary Public - California | 
I v i S S ? / Ins Angela Cotfrty 
Residincat: Los Angeles, Calllornia 
My Commission Expires: 
July 19, 2003 
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/ t'l'sfa 
Wolf Mountain Resons. LC 
Bv; 
COUNTY QK__ lfji/rMwA \ 
Jf^C u "Tltc Focceomc ir.stnimetit was acknowledged before nit this /of dav of / w L-y s 1999 M . 
* >^ 32§>% Notary Puailc "1 
p i« / P*<vC«j. Uu* IM06&
 r 
My Cottinussion Expires: 
w. fi 
Notary Public / ) 4 & 
Residing at- \J&<i{/} fA& 
u$ 
"71 
ST A l l : . OF. UJLft ( 
COUNTY ca^il/ii^fwy 
' lf<ri 
Willow Dpi*', LC 
"/^Vw B ^ i ^ 2 ^ 
^ 
" iJS. 
/ ^ . . . ^ f 
/ / " ' " The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this J*~) day of ff ^v u , 
I W bv* I ~ . ~~" V
 r ,j 
_ — — fi ^ W_/7 
Notary Public t 
BARBARA LMYEfiS » 
I / J T & S J ^ ^\iT^Smmw \ Notary-Pubt«v~. .a 
WfflSSft !1 PwKCity.Uwi»B40» . ^f-% y // 7/?"" 
* « * « ^ • Residing: {JlXAJA.^ L,/s 
My Comtnissio-n Expires: 
Q 0 5 S 3 9 1 1 BKC«1297 F'600490 
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•The Hansen Group,. IX 
SJKlll OF UTA^ ) 
COUNTY QF " ^ M i r U A g g ^ . l 
Robert M & Joaii E. Asile 
By; 
lis: 
STATE OF. 1 
COUNTY QF „ ) 
Theloiqjomg instrument vvas acknevw]edged before me Lim-^  day of 
(999, by" " . 
Notary Public 
.Residing at; ,„ _ _ ^ _ _ 
My C-cunmission Expires: 
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tlalbctEngineering, Inc. 
By- ^U^r&l<£. T ^ U ^ C ^ C 
STATE OF -^WU 
COUNTY OF UVflU. 
:ss. 
The ibregqmg mstnimeaii; was admmviedgsd before me litis . J 3 _ day of /UoQEfogg?' 
1999, by {JflgflLP £* BftBffidE:,?**&! t c t t r or KH U$£"T & • # / U @ & £ J « r , / ^ -
IMSaEB state d u i ^ 
4 iBrt ttmnaafctK Parte Q y U t 640901 
My Commission Expires: 
Rotary Public 
Residingat: «^ fi- /Jp*^, t/un /r ^ u . . *-d> 
Harold E. Babcock 
B?: ^ iWaciT 7%*uu 
\® 
STATE OF U4sA 
COUNTY QF U-Vsk 
The foregoing instromeuii was acknowledged before me tins ./%*"** day o f r J ^ ^ ^ B l , 
* 999, by titt&fcP E- t ^ d s q c . % ~ , - > " 
SPACER G SANDSZS 
Notary Pubftc $> 
f W f f t G t f State cpf Utah I 
1 x S E ^ ^ O o m r a & p h s t New \12003f 
1 1&40 SurpeofcPrFQTfc Ct!y U78409ef 
U6my Public 
Residing at: 6f f l^ Lfl££ LtutSff' 
My Commission Expires: 
Q O 5 5 3 9 1 1 BKO 1297 PG004?2 
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NQU-12-1S39 20;IB The Canyons. RE Develop. -435 615 4855 F.82^Q3 
DRM Invcstmept Company, L C . 
Its: MtLj/AV,
 tt* ^MJaiii^J^-C 
STATE-OF /W«? ,M?£&_J 
A / t / ; ss-
COUNTY OF / f i g ^ / n A K ' 
Trie foregoing inptmment wgs acknowledged before me this ,/V day of /\D)f£M1£t££L 
1999, by y f r W , , ^ ^ P X * \ * 3 ' * , . 
Notary'Public " - *,;^" 
Residing a t _ * 1
 «», 
My Commission Expires; 
2/ldfh ^ 
0 0 5 5 3 9 1 1 6*01297 FG004?3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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nijv--1&— i.^j-p^ ex? >• i ^ HIV i . a i l U W i l i l INU. 4 * v w *i-'K • 
STATE OF ^ 
COUNTY OF
 y / K ^ )/^K ) 
ijfa— * / . 
e foregoing instnxment was acknowledged before me this i i day of / w V ^ f f i f e j s K . Tii 
199: 
My Commission Expires: 
Residing at; 
3 I* */& d 
O Q 5 5 S 9 1 I ttaO'129? P*00\U 
TDTfiL F.0S 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jac-kBam'ard 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT 
; ss, 




SPBJC8? G SANDERS 
Notary Pubr«c 
State of Uh3h 
^ ^ M>* Gyrni Espara New 12 SXB 
tB*0 Sunpeofc Dr Port; Cfty OT 84TPC 
O D S 5 3 ? 1 1 BK01297 PG0IH95 
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W'iiham Lincoln Spoor 
Xeslee SherriU 
Its: 
I STATE OF I A,-1 ) 
COUNTY OF f-^JfWVtlJ \ 
The foregpinE inBtrumefSfjvras acknowledsed before/fee \ h ^ ' d a y of • , / l g V 
1 ^<rtt>v wtii«o* p».jii-uc-
/ $ § R m CATHERINE 3AWM ; 
l IV v S W ' Y A ' *0fi $»W C«jf& Uinrt 9»*t«f/ f ; 
MY Gdminission Expires: 
/ \ 
Notary Public _ I 
Residing at; C l ^ m , (J I 




: S S . 
J 





My Commission Expires: D 0 5 5 3 ? I i Biv0i2?? 
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William Lincoln Spoor 
Lesice ShciriU 
la; 
STATU OF U7 
i COUNTY OF ^WArmJ 
The foresting insrrun^i ^.acknowledged before rn«^us /••>*"' ? day o!j]£\^ 
1999. bv^  IMiTri^yfimyf^^ _ / | 
P " ^ ^ '"''fEln^ Public"' " l u l l ) 
i/¥%$$\ CATHEIIINE OALYAI
 f 
* / *fik:*Pk' \ n ' ^ S , l j nv c'fi{!fi; Ifer"'*' S ^ ' ' w * 
$ \ 4 . TKifw /»v My Caiw»*»ww Eat*** i 
My gw^mj^sira. Expires: 
Moiaiy Public ^ ] 
Residing at: ^ ^ # 4 ? , Wf 






The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before mc this
 a 





My Commission Expires: 
0 0 5 5 3 9 1 1 Btf01297 PeQ04*7 
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William Lincoln Spoor 
Lesbi SbcrriU 




STATE OF _JL 
J* JL. 
COUNTY OF ^ ^ 7 > 1 ^ ! > 
• ss... 
The foregoinc instrum^pt wss acfe^owledged befcrcfmc*\this j f ^ _ say 0I' Jj 
1999.by l^Sk&S><pd$&~, m / ,j A _ iW 
I ^•i&K . No^aiy Public 
• ^ CATWEnWEDALYAI 
.5 i l l vB&SB hi
 k ''** cuy, tram G4i)eo . 
My C i^nmispiDAj Expires: 
Notary Public l^j 
Residing at: . C ^ ' T f f i . / U f 
"• A ) 
Iron Mountain Associates, LLC 
STATE OF. 
COUNTY OF. J 
:ss". 
ns~ 
The: foregoing- inscrujuent was acknowledged before me this
 t day of _ 
1999, by . 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
O O S ' 3 3 9 1 1 BKO 1297 PGO£K98 
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William Lincoln Spoor 
LeslcfiherriU 
lis: 
7 \X i ST Al t OF 
COUNTY OF ^ ^ H / > ? ^ 
: ss. 
The fo rgo ing instrument > s s acknowledged before metftis / c s day of /Jul/ 
1999,bs:/^U^6.CffiQrL., / \ . /) n 
( tikiiiMM^ 
* mk?m \3 Iafl3 Siia* c'B,Jk6iiv6. ft^te M ! Notary rub.1 ic 1 | 
My Comrrussion Expires: ay LOTnrruj 
•.Iron -Monnuir; Associates, LLC 
T V 
Its,: 
STATE O F . 
COUNTY O F . 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this day of. 
1999, by* . 
'Notary Public 
Residing at;, 
My Commission Expires: 
D 0 5 J 5 3 9 1 I &K01297 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATE OF 
rntnsrrynr iMfK 
The foregoing uistrmnent was acknowledged before me this 
1W,by TpffApryiLhtAn . 
TOTfiu P»S2 
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i^ > <—' J . *.» s_J J . V-> .*- <~J —i 
OU,> WJ 'J r» . U£* tit 
Beaver £rcck Associ ates / 
t^7\^ 
STATE OF. MXM 
COUNTYOF ^UNXM. IT" J 
Tbe foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this JjL^^f of /'^ffii^feft—< 
1999, by 12flj&10 ygt-P/>U A - U u ^ i i P ^ vuJs'U " 
Notary PgbJ; 
Raiding>t- "hM^U-rr CfrLtfTY 
MY Commission Expires: iSSion expires; 
STATE OF _jJI±L 
COUNTY OF. >hiCuli o^ 
:ss. 
fa: e ^ i o . n ^
 t ^ ^ - ^ f e 
Tacforegoinginsuuniciiiwasacknowledgedbeforemtthis_A day of/M( I 7^  J_, 
1999, by" UM?fv J /%iw"b 
s-g^ WiLUAM E. CA5A0AV 
V a a X gtU4iy[. gyp JAN. % 8K» 
My Commission Empties: 
•*..-. i v -U70U 
/FWn 
Notary Public 
Residing at: b'MU&r Gfr^y 
0 0 5 5 3 9 i i BKO.1297 PcOO^ Oi 
TOTAL P.02 
tot ' 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
WiKiafft Lincoln Spoor 
LesJsc Shcrr^ Spoat 
STATE OF JLiL-
Tpc {brcgoin^instrurn^nt was acknowledged before m« this _/£" day of / ^ 
_ rtilbuqu /Lkl<k: 
t M l l k CAlllEBdlirMALYAI .Woiar/Kuour \ j 
IYW®8*J?J M l^.>nrt'ic?".Hfcrt.«^ . <( Residing at:.. <2**J-**-tM*i L V 
tj/fy Compi^y^ Expires *•»—.-*--..«.•• nt^y^Expi: 
STATE OF 
COUNTY O F " ^ — > 
The 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATE OF *=** ' WAU 
Sl:i Urid/fclC , ; /* <*^ 
Its/ ^V^F- fiUzrs&wr 
COUNTY O F ^ ' l f r K K f ' 
The foregoing, instrument was acknowledged before \m this M day of A-'OD 
OiC£ y%e&bBAsr SF t^tuz^- &*>£-
5FBCER G SANDSS 
Notary pubfic 
State of Utah 
y My Comrr.. brora Hav \2L 2DQ3 
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